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Abstract 
______________________ 
 
THE USE OF Biometrics keeps growing. Every day, we use biometric recognition to 
unlock our phones or to have access to places such as the gym or the office, so we rely 
on what security manufacturers offer when protecting our privileges and private life. 
Moreover, an error in a biometric system can mean that a person can have access to an 
unintended property, critical infrastructure or cross a border. Thus, there is a growing 
interest on ensuring that biometric systems work correctly on two fronts: our personal 
information (smartphones, personal computers) and national security (borders, 
critical infrastructures). 
Given that nowadays we store increasing sensitive data on our mobile devices 
(documents, photos, bank accounts, etc.), it is crucial to know how secure the 
protection of the phone really is. Most new smartphones include an embedded 
fingerprint sensor due to its improved comfort, speed and, as manufacturers claim, 
security. In the last decades, many studies and tests have shown that it is possible to 
steal a person’s fingerprint and reproduce it, with the intention of impersonating them. 
This has become a bigger problem as the adoption of fingerprint sensor cell phones 
have become mainstream. 
For the case of border control and critical infrastructures, biometric recognition 
eases the task of person identification and black-list checking. Although the 
performance rates for verification and identification have dropped in the last decades, 
protection against vulnerabilities is still under heavy development. There have been 
cases in the past where fake fingers have been used to surpass the security of such 
entities. 
The first necessary step for overcoming these issues is to have a common ground 
for performing security evaluations. This way, different systems’ abilities to detect and 
reject fake fingerprints can be measured and compared against each other. This is 
achieved by standardization and the corresponding certification of biometric systems. 
The new software and hardware presentation attack detection techniques shall 
undergo tests that follow such standards.  
The aim of this Thesis is two-fold: evaluating commercial fingerprint biometric 
systems against presentation attacks (fake fingers) and developing a new presentation 
attack detection method for overcoming these attacks. Moreover, through this process, 
several contributions were proposed and accepted in international ISO standards. 
On the first matter, a few questions are meant to be answered: it is well known that 
it is possible to hack a smartphone using fake fingers made of Play-Doh and other easy-
to-obtain materials but, to what extent? Is this true for all users or only for specialists 
with deep knowledge on Biometrics? Does it matter who the person doing the attack 
is, or are all attackers the same when they have the same base knowledge? Are 
smartphone fingerprint sensors as reliable as desktop sensors? What is the easiest way 
of stealing a fingerprint from someone? To answer these, five experiments were 
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performed on several desktop and smartphone fingerprint readers, including many 
different attackers and fingerprint readers. As a general result, all smartphone capture 
devices could be successfully hacked by inexperienced people with no background in 
Biometrics. All of the evaluations followed the pertinent standards, ISO/IEC 30107 
Parts 3 and 4 and Common Criteria and an analysis of the attack potential was carried 
out. Moreover, the knowledge gathered during this process served to make 
methodological contributions to the above-mentioned standards. 
Once some expertise had been gathered on attacking fingerprint sensors, it was 
decided to develop a new method to detect fake fingerprints. The aim was to find a low-
cost and efficient system to solve this issue. As a result, a new optical system was used 
to capture fingerprints and classify them into real or fake samples. The system was 
tested by performing an evaluation using 5 different fake finger materials, obtaining 
much lower error rates than those reported in the state of the art at the moment this 
Thesis was written. 
The contributions of this Thesis include: 
• Improvements on the presentation attack detection evaluation 
methodology. 
• Contributions to ISO/IEC 30107 - Biometric presentation attack detection - 
Part 3:  Testing and reporting and Part 4: Profile for evaluation of mobile 
devices. 
• Presentation attack detection evaluations on commercial desktop and 
smartphone fingerprint sensors following ISO/IEC 30107-3 and 4. 
• A new low-cost and efficient optical presentation attack detection 
mechanism and an evaluation on the said system. 
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Resumen 
______________________ 
 
EL USO DE la Biometría está en constante crecimiento. Cada día, utilizamos 
reconocimiento biométrico para desbloquear nuestros teléfonos o para tener acceso a 
lugares como el gimnasio o la oficina, por lo que confiamos en lo que los fabricantes 
ofrecen para proteger nuestros privilegios y nuestra vida privada. Además, un error en 
un sistema biométrico puede significar que una persona pueda tener acceso a una 
propiedad no debida, a una infraestructura crítica o a cruzar una frontera. Por lo tanto, 
existe un interés creciente en asegurar que los sistemas biométricos funcionen 
correctamente en dos frentes: nuestra información personal (teléfonos inteligentes, 
ordenadores personales) y la seguridad nacional (fronteras, infraestructuras críticas). 
Dado que hoy en día almacenamos cada vez más datos sensibles en nuestros 
dispositivos móviles (documentos, fotos, cuentas bancarias, etc.), es crucial saber cómo 
de segura es realmente la protección del teléfono. La mayoría de los nuevos teléfonos 
inteligentes incluyen un sensor de huellas dactilares integrado debido a su mayor 
comodidad, velocidad y, como afirman los fabricantes, seguridad. En las últimas 
décadas, muchos estudios y pruebas han demostrado que es posible robar la huella 
dactilar de una persona y reproducirla, con la intención de hacerse pasar por ella. Esto 
se ha convertido en un problema mayor a medida que la adopción de los teléfonos 
celulares con sensor de huellas dactilares se ha ido generalizando. 
En el caso del control fronterizo y de las infraestructuras críticas, el reconocimiento 
biométrico facilita la tarea de identificación de las personas y la comprobación de listas 
negras. Aunque las tasas de rendimiento en materia de verificación e identificación han 
disminuido en las últimas décadas, la protección antifraude todavía está bajo intenso 
desarrollo. Existen casos en los que se han utilizado dedos falsos para vulnerar la 
seguridad de dichas entidades. 
El primer paso necesario para superar estos problemas es contar con una base 
común desde la que realizar evaluaciones de seguridad. De esta manera, se pueden 
medir y comparar las capacidades de los diferentes sistemas para detectar y rechazar 
huellas dactilares falsas. Esto se consigue mediante la estandarización y la 
correspondiente certificación de los sistemas biométricos. Las nuevas técnicas de 
detección de ataques de presentación de software y hardware deben someterse a 
pruebas que se ajusten a dichas normas.  
Esta Tesis tiene dos objetivos: evaluar los sistemas biométricos de huellas dactilares 
comerciales contra ataques de presentación (dedos falsos) y desarrollar un nuevo 
método de detección de ataques de presentación para disminuir la eficacia de estos 
ataques. Además, a través de este proceso, se propusieron y aceptaron varias 
contribuciones en las normas internacionales ISO. 
Sobre el primer asunto, hay que responder algunas preguntas: es bien sabido que 
es posible hackear un teléfono inteligente con dedos falsos hechos de Play-Doh y otros 
materiales fáciles de obtener, pero ¿hasta qué punto? ¿Es esto cierto para todos los 
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usuarios o sólo para los especialistas con un profundo conocimiento de la Biometría? 
¿Importa quién es la persona que realiza el ataque, o todos los atacantes son iguales 
cuando parte de la misma base de conocimiento? ¿Son los sensores de huellas 
dactilares de los teléfonos inteligentes tan fiables como los de sobremesa? ¿Cuál es la 
manera más fácil de robar una huella digital a alguien? Para responder estas preguntas, 
se realizaron cinco experimentos en varios lectores de huellas dactilares de escritorio y 
de teléfonos inteligentes, incluyendo muchos atacantes y lectores de huellas dactilares 
diferentes. Como resultado general, todos los dispositivos de captura pudieron ser 
hackeados con éxito por personas sin experiencia en Biometría. Todas las evaluaciones 
siguieron las normas pertinentes, ISO/IEC 30107 Partes 3 y 4 y Common Criteria y se 
llevó a cabo un análisis del potencial de ataque. Además, los conocimientos adquiridos 
durante este proceso sirvieron para aportar una contribución metodológica a las 
normas mencionadas. 
Una vez adquiridos algunos conocimientos sobre ataques a sensores de huellas 
dactilares, se decidió desarrollar un nuevo método para detectar huellas falsas. El 
objetivo era encontrar un sistema de bajo coste y eficiente para resolver este problema. 
Como resultado, se utilizó un nuevo sistema óptico para capturar las huellas dactilares 
y clasificarlas en muestras reales o falsas. El sistema se probó mediante la realización 
de una evaluación utilizando 5 materiales de dedos falsos diferentes, obteniendo tasas 
de error mucho más bajas que las reportadas en el estado del arte en el momento de 
redactar esta Tesis. 
Las contribuciones de esta Tesis incluyen: 
• Mejoras en la metodología de evaluación de detección de ataques de 
presentación. 
• Contribuciones a “ISO/IEC 30107 - Biometric presentation attack detection - 
Part 3:  Testing and reporting” y “Part 4: Profile for evaluation of mobile 
devices”. 
• Evaluaciones de detección de ataques de presentación en sensores de huellas 
dactilares comerciales de escritorio y de teléfonos inteligentes siguiendo la 
norma ISO/IEC 30107-3 y 4. 
• Un nuevo y eficiente mecanismo óptico de detección de ataques de 
presentación, de bajo coste, y una evaluación de dicho sistema. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction  
______________________ 
 
BIOMETRIC RECOGNITION HAS become a commonplace technology in our everyday 
lives. We use it to unlock our phones, to get in the gym or to enter the office due to its 
comfort of use [4] and freeing us from remembering passwords [5], [6]. Nevertheless, 
when sensitive data (personal pictures, documents) or privileges (gym membership, 
food coupons) are at stake, we need to make sure that we know how secure these 
systems are.  
There have been many tests of fingerprint sensors’ ability to detect attacks in the 
last decade [7]–[15]. For that end, different materials were used to create fake fingers 
and use them on capture devices, to check if an attacker would be able to bypass the 
security. When the first smartphones with embedded fingerprint sensors were 
released, fake fingers were created to try to attack the system, and succeeded [16]. It 
was rapidly spread on the media that biometric recognition was not secure, and that 
people should not trust it. Soon after, it was proven that an attacker can steal a person’s 
fingerprint by taking a picture of it from a distance [17]. 
The simulated attackers that performed these tests were, to the best of our 
knowledge, researchers or proficient in Biometrics. Moreover, the released videos only 
show one attempt, which showed to be successful. However: how many attempts did 
they need until it worked? How long had they been working on Biometrics? What was 
their expertise? These questions were left unanswered. 
To answer them, it is necessary to follow a common methodology to have 
comparable security evaluations and to give a complete understanding of how the 
systems behave against attacks. This is what was achieved with this work. To fulfill the 
need of comparable security evaluations, there are several tools like Common Criteria 
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[3] and its evaluation methodology, CEM (Common Methodology for Information 
Technology Security Evaluation) [18]. Although, these are focused on Information 
Technology security in general and need some adaptation for the case of Biometrics. 
More particularly, for the attacks at the capture level, the so-called presentation 
attacks. Hence, a new family of ISO standard was created, ISO/IEC 30107-x [1], to 
address the need of standardizing the evaluation of Presentation Attack Detection 
(PAD). Also, some other works have been done covering methodologies and best 
practices to evaluate security [19][20] and to evaluate the performance of sensors 
embedded in smartphones [21]. A methodology unifying both was proposed in [22]. 
This work gathers 5 studies following thoroughly these standards, in order to give a 
complete answer to the attack resistance ability of these systems. The reasons that 
motivated the studies and what was done in each are detailed on Figure 1. The thesis 
structure is outlined on Figure 2. 
 
Figure 1. Reasoning and unifying thread of each study. 
First, the idea was to get acquainted with the state of the art in fingerprint sensor 
attacks by trying different fake fingers on 4 desktop readers: 1 thermal, 2 capacitive 
and 1 optical. In total, 4,672 attacks were attempted using 7 different PAI species (fake 
finger material) [23]. Both cooperative and non-cooperative tests were made (that is, 
with and without collaboration from the capture subject). Also, the results were 
reported according to one of the very first drafts of the more recently published 
ISO/IEC standard (i.e. ISO/IEC 30107 - Biometric presentation attack detection). 
Once expertise had been gained on this first approach to fingerprint attacks, it was 
decided to aim for the case of mobile devices for three main reasons: they are widely 
and increasingly used devices, it has barely been researched and no evaluations have 
been performed, at least publicly. To gain a wide overview of the matter, 4 different 
studies were carried out on attacks on mobile devices (studies 2-5). 
For study 2, the 3 most interesting PAI species (according to ease of production, 
success on attacks or level of resemblance to real finger) from the first study were 
chosen to attempt attacks on 5 smartphones that have embedded fingerprint sensors, 
summing a total of 2,669 attacks [22]. This experiment was performed by the same 
evaluator of the first experiment (the author of this Thesis), thus having gathered 
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knowledge on how to perform attacks. All the artefacts were created in a collaborative 
manner in this case. 
For the third study, the goal was to find the easiest way to steal a latent fingerprint 
from someone’s phone screen. This way, it would emulate the case of an attacker 
stealing a smartphone and then using the fingerprints from the screen to create 
artefacts and attack the capture device. Thus, in this case, the attacks were non-
cooperative. In total, 17,100 attack attempts were performed on the same 5 
smartphones from the previous evaluation, and all smartphones were successfully 
attacked. 
After having two evaluations where biometric experts were attacking mobile 
devices in a cooperative and non-cooperative manner, the next question arose: “Can 
non-experts hack smartphone fingerprint sensors, too?” Two different studies (4 and 
5) were carried out to answer this question: Study 4 and Study 5. 
For study 4, we gave 36 simulated attackers with no background in Biometrics one 
week to attack one smartphone’s fingerprint reader (5 smartphones in total, same ones 
than in the second study). Each had to, at least, use 3 capture subjects and use each 
material at least 120 times on the smartphone sensor, making a total of 10,034 
attempts. As more than one week would be needed to create non-cooperative fake 
fingers, the study was focused only on cooperative attacks.  
For study 5, we decided to carry out a hackathon of attacking fingerprint readers 
embedded in mobile devices. 10 attackers with no previous experience in attacking 
biometric devices were given a week to research attack methods and 12 hours to attack 
the smartphones. A wide variety of readily available materials (from the supermarket 
or online marketplaces) were used for creating the artefacts. 
After having performed these studies, it was possible to make a comparison of the 
attack potential for each case and get results, and thus answer if attacking fingerprint 
sensors is a matter of expertise and how many attempts are needed to successfully 
attack them, in average. 
After commercial desktop and mobile fingerprint readers were evaluated using 
standards, it was decided to develop a new system to detect fake fingers. For that, this 
second part of the Thesis focuses on obtaining a low-cost and efficient hardware 
solution for detecting presentation attacks. With that goal, a pre-study was performed 
using a narrow-band camera to obtain images of real and fake fingers in 10nm 
increments of wavelength and, once the images were gathered, different approaches 
were tried to classify the samples into real or fake fingers. After that, a new approach 
was developed: 2 handheld microscopes with special lighting were used to perform a 
PAD (Presentation Attack Detection) evaluation by capturing 7,704 images of fake and 
real fingerprints of 17 subjects. These images were processed and classified using Bag 
of Features algorithms, obtaining an attack classification error of 1.78% at 70% training 
samples (3.99% for 50% training).  
Evaluation of Presentation Attack Detection under the Context of Common Criteria 
______________________ 
4 
 
 
Figure 2. Thesis structure outline. 
This document is divided in 9 chapters: an introduction to biometric recognition, 
an overview on the state of the art in fingerprint presentation attack detection and 
vulnerabilities, a description of the methodologies used throughout the Thesis, 
evaluations, a new system for attack detection and the lessons that were learnt during 
the process:  
Chapter 2: This chapter gives an overview on biometric recognition. First, a brief 
history is summarized, then biometric recognition systems are described and, lastly, 
there is a subsection on security evaluations on fingerprint biometric systems. This 
section details all the points where a biometric system can be vulnerable and then 
focuses on the attack type that is of concern in this Thesis: the presentation attack. 
Moreover, the international standard that deals with this type of attack is explained in 
this section, ISO/IEC 30107. 
Chapter 3: The state of the art of presentation attack detection in fingerprint 
biometric systems is given in this chapter. It starts with an overview of the most known 
technologies of fingerprint sensors and then details the state of the art in presentation 
attack detection evaluations and developed mechanisms. 
Chapter 4: Once the state of the art and the corresponding standards are 
explained, this chapter details the methodology that was developed and applied during 
the experiments of this Thesis. Also, an overview of the different studies is given here 
for clarification purposes. 
Chapter 5: This is the first chapter that deals with experiments. In particular, an 
evaluation is performed with fake fingers on 3 desktop fingerprint readers following 
ISO/IEC 30107 and the results and conclusions are given. 
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Chapter 6: As a follow-up from the previous chapter, this one deals with PAD 
evaluations performed on smartphones that have an embedded fingerprint sensor. A 
methodology for carrying out PAD evaluations on mobile devices is developed and 
applied here, and an evaluation is performed with cooperative and non-cooperative 
attacks. Also, a novel and easy method is explained to steal latent fingerprints from 
smartphone screens. 
Chapter 7: After having performed attacks on mobile devices by experts, this 
chapter covers two additional studies but carried out by 48 inexperienced attackers. It 
tries to answer the question: “does experience count when attacking fingerprint 
capture devices? Do different attackers with the same knowledge get different results?” 
Chapter 8: Once several experiments have been performed using fake fingers on 
desktop and mobile devices, it was decided to develop a new PAD mechanism based on 
the distinctiveness of skin and fake fingers illuminated by different wavelengths. In 
this chapter, two approaches are shown: using a narrow-band camera and using special 
lighting portable microscopes to capture fake and real fingers. An evaluation is 
performed with both and results and conclusions are given. 
Chapter 9: Lastly, this chapter gives a closing to the document by noting the 
lessons that were learnt during the process and suggesting future lines of work. 
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Chapter 2. Biometric recognition 
______________________ 
 
HUMAN IDENTIFICATION CAN be based on three things, or a combination of them, as 
IBM said in 1970 [24]: 
What you know. For instance, a password. A user should have a different one for 
each application, and they should be complicated enough not to be stolen. That would 
imply having to remember difficult and long passwords, so a high percentage of users 
end up setting easy ones. 
What you have. For instance, an ID card. This removes the problem of forgetting 
passwords by keeping a card in the wallet, but it adds the possibility of getting stolen 
or being left somewhere. 
What you are. For example, a fingerprint. This eliminates the problems of both 
forgetting and losing something but has its own disadvantages. This will be the topic 
covered on this Thesis.  
Biometric recognition is the identification of an individual by measuring an aspect 
of his/her biology or behavior. Its three main targets are allowing recognition where 
human intervention is not possible, avoiding misrecognition due to tiredness and 
improving the human-machine interaction.  
2.1 A brief history of biometric recognition 
Human recognition goes back in time as much as humans do. We recognize others 
mainly by the shape of the face, the voice or the behavior. Biometric recognition tries 
to imitate this ability to identify individuals. Biometrics as a science is considered to 
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have started when an objective statement of the identity of a person was needed: a 
handwritten signature, body measurements, fingerprints etc.  
Handwritten signature is considered to be the first biometric modality. It was 
needed to sign documents and other official statements. Those persons who could not 
write, drew a cross or any other mark.  
In the 18th century, Thomas Bewick, a British engraver and natural history author, 
decided to sign his works with his thumb fingerprint [25]. He did not use it 
scientifically, only for originality or for marketing reasons. The real origin of Biometrics 
is in 1823, when Joannes E. Purkinje developed a detailed study on ridges and valleys 
of fingerprints, and classified fingerprints into 9 types [26]. However, fingerprints were 
not yet adopted as a real mean to identify subjects.  
In the last decade of the 19th century, Bertillon’s identification anthropometrique 
was developed. It was a standard procedure based on taking measurements from the 
human body, such as the chest, head or feet [27].  
Based on Purkinje’s studies, in 1858, Sir William Herschel mandated that all Indian 
natives had to register their hand palms to “avoid dishonesty”, but it was meant only 
to intimidate them [28][29]. Nevertheless, as the database grew, he suspected that palm 
lines and fingerprints could be unique for each person. Then, during the 1870s, Dr. 
Henry Faulds began studying the uniqueness and time permanence of fingerprints. He 
created a classification system and sent it to Sir Charles Darwin, who could not help 
him and forwarded the information to his nephew, Sir Francis Galton, who did not give 
it any importance at the beginning. 
In the late 19th century, Sir Francis Galton performed some studies on fingerprints, 
based on papers by Dr. Henry Faulds. He demonstrated the uniqueness of fingerprints 
by estimating the probability of seeing 2 identical fingerprints in 1 over 64 million. He 
also demonstrated that they remain stable in time and that they are internal features 
(that is, if a layer of skin is removed, the same shape is shown again). Furthermore, he 
designed a method for obtaining inked impressions of fingerprints, defined 3 patterns 
of fingerprints and created a human classification system by using the 10 fingers of a 
person [30]. 
In 1894, Scotland Yard decided to complement Bertillon’s system with Galton’s. On 
the same year, Sir Edward Henry, Inspector-General of Police of Bengal (India), 
exchanged letters with Galton due to the problems he was finding when registering the 
population. He was convinced that the system based on fingerprints was much better 
than Bertillon’s system, decided to take prints of the fingers of all prisoners, and 
demonstrated that identification based on fingerprints was possible. As a result, he 
improved the human classification with fingerprints, it became a success in the West 
Indies and was adopted by Scotland Yard in 1900 [31]. 
The first attempt to use an automated biometric recognition arose from the need to 
process fingerprints in the criminal justice system. Historically, an expert had to 
examine fingerprint images, classify them by patterns and manually compare them to 
check if there was a match to previously stored images. However, in the early 20th 
century, the number or fingerprint images that needed processing and matching 
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increased greatly. Hence, an automatic process was highly needed. Soon, other 
biometric modalities were discovered, studied and developed [32]. 
Enormous attention was put on Biometrics after the terrorist attacks in the US on 
September 11, 2001. After this event, biometric recognition systems were introduced 
at national borders to prevent the use of fake identities from entering the country. In 
recent years, biometric recognition has widely been introduced in people’s lives. 
Smartphones include it as a comfortable and secure way to be unlocked, as well as 
computers, and they can be found at gyms or work places for people to get in without 
the need of a guard checking identities.  
2.2 Biometric recognition systems 
Most biometric recognition systems can be described by the diagram on Figure 3. 
First, a data capture subsystem is needed to obtain the wanted sample from the sample, 
it is then stored in the data storage subsystem, compared against previously stored 
references and, lastly, a decision is made based on the said comparison to check 
whether it is the correct individual.  
 
Figure 3. Components of a biometric system [33]. 
The first step is to capture raw biometric data from a subject (presentation), which 
is done through a sensor by translating it into a digital sample. No two samples will 
ever be the same, as no presentation can ever be done equally twice. Then, the sample 
is processed to extract needed features. In face recognition, the eyes need to be found; 
in fingerprints, minutiae (ridge endings or bifurcations). In this stage, the quality of 
the sample is analyzed. If the quality is too poor, a re-capture will be done. Once the 
quality is good enough, a reference is created and stored in a database. This is called 
enrollment.  
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Once a subject has been enrolled, two types of recognition can be done: verification 
and identification. Verification is the process to check if the subject is who he or she 
claims to be. It is a 1:1 comparison, because it compares the presented sample to the 
subject’s previously stored sample. An example of this is a user who wants to unlock 
his or her phone with the fingerprint. Identification is the process of locating a subject 
among an entire database of previously enrolled users. It is, thus, a 1:N comparison. It 
is used mainly for forensics, for victim or criminal identification. 
Although biometric recognition entails many different modalities (e.g. fingerprint, 
iris, face, handwritten signature, gait), this Thesis will focus on fingerprint recognition, 
as it is widely used in access control and, increasingly nowadays, smartphone 
unlocking. In order to ensure the intended operation of the biometric application, it is 
necessary to evaluate the systems. These can undergo several different types of 
evaluations: performance, conformance, security, human computer interaction, 
privacy, etc. This work will focus on presentation attack detection (PAD) evaluations, 
which are part of security evaluations (Figure 4).  
 
Figure 4. Diagram of the focus of this Thesis. 
2.3 Security evaluation of fingerprint biometric systems 
This section will give an overview of security evaluation on fingerprint biometric 
systems, which is the focus of this Thesis, as it was noted on the last section. This will 
be divided into general vulnerability points in a biometric system and then it will be 
narrowed down to presentation attack detection evaluation according to its 
corresponding standard, ISO/IEC 30107. 
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2.3.1 Vulnerabilities in fingerprint biometric recognition 
Biometrics is entirely based on probability. Every time an individual presents a 
sample to the system, the captured information will be different for several reasons: 
behavior of the subject, movement, environmental conditions or physical aging. That 
is, a system can never be absolutely sure of a subject’s identity. 
The vulnerability of a system is a different concept from the accuracy of a system. 
A system can be very accurate, meaning that it can distinguish well between two 
individuals, but it can be highly insecure. Over the years, focus has been put mainly on 
improving accuracy (performance), while the assessment of vulnerabilities has been 
overlooked. Knowing and studying a system’s vulnerabilities is becoming more crucial 
as Biometrics’ use increases (cellular phones, computers, access control, etc.).   
Figure 5 shows that a biometric system is composed by several connected 
subsystems, each with its own point of attack. These can be exploited in the following 
manners: 
 
Figure 5. Vulnerability points in a biometric recognition system [33]. 
1. Presentation: A fake biometric trait is presented, or a real subject modifies the 
sample to make it seem like another (for example, using makeup). Also, the real 
subject might be forced to use his or her biometric trait unwillingly.  
2. Biometric claim: The use of a fake or stolen identifier to create a false claim of 
identity. For example, an attacker who creates a fake ID and then proceeds to get a 
fake identity at a government office with his or her fingerprint.  
3. Biometric sensor: Faking the sensor. The signal processing subsystem should be 
able to check the integrity of the reader by cryptographic techniques. For example, 
a computer camera can be replaced with a different one that always sends the same 
image [32]. 
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4. Captured biometric sample: data can be intercepted for later use if the 
connection is not secure. Also, a fake biometric sample can be substituted for the 
real one.  
5. Quality control, enhancement and feature extraction: In enrollment, if a 
low-quality sample is used, it can be easier to attack afterwards.  
6. Re-capture: Allowing many capture trials lets the attacker learn which attack 
methods work best on the system. 
7. Reference creation: Reference generation code can be modified in order to suit 
the attacker’s needs to enter the system. 
8. Transmission – Reference to enrollment: if the channel is insecure, 
enrollment data can be substituted before it reaches the database 
9. Transmission – Features to database: as in the previous case, if the channel 
is insecure, the sample could be substituted before it is stored. 
10. Biometric enrollment database: this is the source of authentication data. If it 
is compromised, modifications and substitutions could occur.  
11. Transmission – Reference from database: if the channel is insecure, an 
attacker could substitute references before they are compared. 
12. Comparison process: this process generates a similarity score with the sample 
and the reference template. This could be compromised, giving high scores to the 
wanted samples.  
13. Transmission – score: if not transmitted securely, the score can be modified. 
14. Threshold process: the match threshold could be modified and set to any value, 
so that attackers could be accepted easily by the system. 
15. Candidate list: it can be modified so that the individual the attacker chooses does 
not appear on the list. 
16. Decision policy: it uses rules to give a final acceptance or rejection based on the 
match results. An attacker could modify it and make his or her own acceptance 
decisions. 
17. Transmission – Outcome: the outcome is transmitted to take action (unlocking 
a door, for example). If it is compromised, the outcome could be changed. 
18. Administration: a malicious administrator can substitute enrollment data or 
reduce thresholds so that attackers can pass under a false identity. 
19. Presentation attack detection: presentation attack detection can be used to 
protect against artefacts. It can also be open to attack: a fingerprint system can use 
heat for presentation attack detection, and an attacker can warm an artefact to fool 
it. 
Of all the points of attack mentioned above, attacks at the presentation level are the 
ones that will be researched in this work. Namely, presentation attacks. 
2.3.2 Presentation attack detection evaluation (ISO/IEC 30107) 
The standard that focuses on evaluating vulnerabilities at the presentation attack 
level is ISO/IEC 30107 – Biometric presentation attack detection. The parts that are 
of concern for this Thesis are Part 3: Testing and reporting and Part 4: Profile for 
evaluation of mobile devices. They address techniques for the automated detection of 
presentation attacks, namely presentation attack detection (PAD) mechanisms, and 
Part 4 focuses on mobile devices, which have some distinct characteristics when being 
evaluated.  
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According to this standard, a presentation attack is the presentation of an artefact 
or of human characteristics to a biometric capture subsystem in a fashion intended 
to interfere with system [1].  As is the case for biometric recognition in general, PAD 
mechanisms are subject to false positive and false negative errors for both bona fide 
and attack presentations. Bona fide presentations refer to the interaction of the 
biometric capture subject and the biometric data capture subsystem in the fashion 
intended by the policy of the biometric system, while attack presentations refer to 
presentation to the biometric data capture subsystem with the goal of interfering with 
the operation of the biometric system [1]. Errors when classifying both types can lead 
to flagging or inconveniencing legitimate users or security breaches. 
All evaluations of PAD mechanisms are determined by the item under test (IUT). 
The IUT is categorized as follows (a diagram of all systems can be seen on Figure 6): 
• PAD subsystem: hardware and/or software that implements a PAD 
mechanism and makes an explicit declaration regarding the detection of 
presentation attacks. Results of the PAD mechanism are accessible to the 
evaluator and are an aspect of the evaluation. 
• Data capture subsystem: consisting of capture hardware or/and 
software, it couples PAD mechanisms and quality checks in a fashion 
opaque to the evaluator. The evaluator may not necessarily know whether 
the data capture subsystem utilizes presentation attack detection. 
Acquisition may be for the purpose of enrollment or recognition, but no 
comparison takes place in the data capture subsystem. 
• Full system: adds biometric comparison to the PAD subsystem or data 
capture subsystem, comprising a full end-to-end system. This leads to 
additional failure points for the Presentation Attack Instrument (PAI) 
beyond PAD mechanisms and quality checks. In a full system, there might 
be one or multiple PAD mechanisms at different points in the system. 
 
Figure 6. Diagram of categories of the IUT (Item Under Test). 
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Depending on the type of system or subsystem, different metrics will be of interest. 
In this work, full systems and PAD subsystems will be addressed. According to the 
standard, these are the relevant metrics for each case: 
• PAD subsystem: 
o APCER (Attack Presentation Classification Error Rate): proportion 
of attack presentations using the same PAI species incorrectly 
classified as bona fide presentations in a specific scenario. 
o BPCER (Bona-fide Presentation Classification Error Rate): 
proportion of bona fide presentations incorrectly classified as 
presentation attacks in a specific scenario. 
• Full system: 
o IAPMR (Impostor Attack Presentation Match Rate): full-system 
evaluation of a verification system proportion of impostor attack 
presentations using the same PAI species in which the target 
reference is matched. 
o APNRR (Attack Presentation Non-Response Rate): proportion of 
attack presentations using the same PAI species that cause no 
response at the PAD subsystem or data capture subsystem. 
o APAR (Attack Presentation Acquisition Rate): proportion of attack 
presentations using the same PAI species from which the data capture 
subsystem acquires a biometric sample of sufficient quality. 
 
This Thesis will deal with PAD evaluations only, not performance ones. For further 
information on performance evaluations, there is extensive work carried out by Tony 
Mansfield, Jim Wayman or Belen Fernandez-Saavedra. Information on how to carry 
out performance evaluations is gathered on the standard ISO/IEC 19795 - Information 
technology – Biometric performance testing and reporting [33]. Within PAD 
evaluations, both full systems (desktop and mobile devices with a fingerprint sensor) 
and PAD subsystems (PAD mechanisms that were developed) will be covered in this 
Thesis.  
 
State of the art 
______________________ 
 
 
    15 
Chapter 3. State of the art 
______________________ 
 
THIS SECTION WILL give a walkthrough on the state of the art of presentation attacks 
for the fingerprint modality. Firstly, details will be given on different techniques to 
attack fingerprint readers and the PAD evaluations that were performed in the 
literature. Secondly, an overview of the PAD mechanisms for the fingerprint modality 
will be detailed. 
3.1 Fingerprint sensors 
This subsection explains the most known and used fingerprint sensor types and 
gives the characteristics of the scanners that were used for this work. This is essential 
for understanding how fake fingers can fool the them. There are many types of 
fingerprint scanners: capacitive, radiofrequency, optical, thermal, piezo resistive, 
ultrasonic etc., but this subsection will only focus on the three most used technologies: 
capacitive, optical and thermal readers. All fingerprint sensors measure physical 
properties from a finger and transform them into a digitalized image of its ridge and 
valley patterns.   
Capacitive sensors use a matrix of capacitors to get an image of the skin, which 
is conductive. One of the capacitor plates is on the device and finger skin acts as the 
other plate [34]. The sensor sends a small voltage to the finger in order to measure the 
capacitance. This capacitance is different between ridges and valleys, because the 
former have a higher capacitance than the latter [7]. This way, an image can be 
generated Figure 7.  
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There are two kinds of capacitive readers: active and passive. The difference 
between them is that the required initial voltage excitation on the skin for active 
sensors needs twice the current draw of the passive ones [35]. 
 
Figure 7. Capacitive fingerprint sensor [34] 
Optical sensors use a matrix of CMOS sensors. The finger is pressed against a 
transparent plate and then illuminated. Through lenses, the image is projected and 
then grabbed by the CMOS sensors [7], generating an image from the fingerprint. 
 
Figure 8. Optical fingerprint sensor [34]  
Thermal sensors use a matrix of temperature sensors formed by a pyro-electric 
material [36]. The temperature of the skin (ridges) and the temperature of the air 
(valleys) is different, and the sensors read and process it to get an image [7] (Figure 9). 
 
Figure 9. Thermal fingerprint sensor [34] 
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3.2 Presentation attack detection evaluation 
Once the fingerprint sensors’ technologies are known, attacks can be designed to 
exploit the specific technology. Optical readers will be vulnerable to non-translucent 
fake fingers; capacitive ones, to materials that are conductive; thermal, to materials 
that are not thermal isolators. 
Fingerprint systems have previously been spoofed with fake artefacts made from 
molds from real fingers, both with the subject’s consent and without. Several materials 
that have properties similar to human skin (i.e. conductance, elasticity, humidity) have 
been found to fool the recognition system [10], [12], [13], [37]–[39]. Already in 1990, 
several sensors started being tested using artefacts, and the system failed to reject them 
even from the first attempt [7]. On 2000, an evaluation was performed on [13] by 
calculating the acceptance rate of 1 user’s finger made with gelatin on 11 readers, where 
the artefacts were accepted by the systems in a very high percentage (the lowest being 
67% fake finger acceptance rate). On 2002, several more attacks were demonstrated 
by using latent fingerprint reactivation on 6 capacitive, 2 optical and 1 thermal 
scanners [40]. For the case of [10], 10 subjects were used to create gelatin fingers and 
use them on 3 capture devices, getting success rates from 44.6% to 76%. On all 
experiments, only index fingers were used. In general, nevertheless, these studies do 
not follow a thorough evaluation procedure nor standard, and merely prove when a 
certain material or technique is effective on specific sensors at least once. The few 
evaluations where numerical results were reported are represented on Table 1. The 
results marked with a * refer to results that were reported in graphs with no exact 
numbers. 
In 2009 [41], Liveness Detection (LivDet) competitions started and continued on 
2011 [39], 2013 [42] and 2015 [43]. Their goal was to compare different liveness 
detection (Presentation Attack Detection) mechanisms by using them on a very large 
database of fake fingers (made of gelatin, latex, ecoflex, Play-Doh, silicone, wood glue 
and modasil). Different academic institutions or industries could try their algorithms 
on the database. Four different sensors were used to acquire the images and the 
evaluations were done using a common testing protocol. 
To the authors’ knowledge, there have not been evaluations specifically focused on 
attacking mobile devices with fake fingers, but there have been reports on found 
vulnerabilities. In 2013, when the first iPhone with an integrated fingerprint reader 
came out, the Chaos Computer Club [16] proved that it was possible to break into the 
device using a white glue fake finger covered with graphite, and the fingerprint could 
be stolen from the phone screen using a scanner and doing some image processing. 
Nonetheless, this was only reported once in a video, not in a complete evaluation. In 
2016, fake fingers were printed using conductive ink (having a sample of the 
fingerprint image beforehand), so they could be used directly on the mobile phone 
sensor without having to create molds previously [44]. This was a technical report to 
inform about the vulnerability, and not an evaluation. 
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Table 1. IAPMR results and characteristics of each evaluation. Only experiments with 
reported numerical results are shown. 
Evaluation Year Sensor technology Cooperation 
Capture 
subjects 
PAI 
species Attempts 
IAPMR 
(%) 
T. 
Matsumoto 
et al. [13]  
2002 
Optical 
Cooperative 5 Gelatin 
100 98* 
Optical 100 71* 
Optical 100 81* 
Optical 100 98* 
Optical 100 90* 
Capacitive 100 84* 
Capacitive 100 75* 
Capacitive 100 91* 
Capacitive 100 79* 
Optical 100 84* 
Optical 100 80* 
Optical 
Non-
cooperative 1 Gelatin 
100 100* 
Optical 100 95* 
Optical 100 100* 
Optical 100 100* 
Optical 100 79* 
Capacitive 100 97* 
Capacitive 100 100* 
Capacitive 100 92* 
Capacitive 100 79* 
Optical 100 100* 
Optical 100 100* 
J. Blommé 
[10] 2003 
Capacitive 
Cooperative 10 Gelatin 
500 55.4 
Optical 500 34.4 
Capacitive 500 24 
A. Wiehe et 
al. [12] 2004 
Optical Cooperative 
1 
Silicone 10 100 
Gelatin 10 0 
Capacitive Cooperative 
Silicone 10 0 
Gelatin 10 0 
Optical Non-cooperative 
Wood 
cement 10 100 
Capacitive Non-cooperative Gelatin 10 0 
M. 
Sandstrom 
et al. [45] 
2004 
Optical 
Non-
cooperative 3 Gelatin 
150 88.5* 
Electric field 150 92.5* 
Electric field 150 47* 
S. Elliott et 
al. [46] 2007 Optical Cooperative 1 Gelatin 163 90.7 
S. Schuckers 
et al. [39], 
[41]–[43] 
2009, 
2011, 
2013, 
2015 
LivDet competitions. Various results, see Table 2 
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3.3 Presentation attack detection mechanisms 
Numerous approaches have been studied and implemented to overcome 
presentation attacks on fingerprint biometric systems [47], divided into software and 
hardware mechanisms. On the software side, there are static methods (sweat pore 
detection [48]–[50], ridge and valley [51]–[53], perspiration [54], [55], etc.) and 
dynamic methods (skin distortion [56], [57], perspiration [58]). For the hardware 
approach, research has been made on challenge/response [59], odor [60], pulse 
oximetry [61], multispectral imaging [62]–[64] and OCT [65]–[67], among others.  
Based on the standard ISO/IEC 30107-3, the IUT (Item Under Test) shall be 
categorized into the PAD subsystem, data capture subsystem and full system, as 
explained previously on subsection 2.3.2. For PAD mechanisms, the pertinent block is 
the PAD subsystem, that is, hardware and/or software that implements a PAD 
mechanism and makes an explicit declaration regarding the detection of presentation 
attacks. 
The metrics that concern us for this literature analysis are the proportion of 
misclassifications of attack and bona fide presentations, that is, APCER (Attack 
Presentation Classification Error Rate) and BPCER (Bona fide Presentation 
Classification Error Rate), respectively. Two tables (Table 2 and Table 3) were filled 
gathering the state-of-the-art results for APCER and BPCER, whenever possible, 
because many studies do not give results according to the standard, and others do not 
report numerical results at all. Also, the materials used for creating the fake fingers are 
detailed. 
Table 2. Software PAD performance with independent evaluators. Results were 
gathered from [47]. 
Algorithm/author PAI species APCER (%) BPCER (%) 
Dermalog [41] 
Gelatin, latex, Play-Doh, white glue, 
silicone, ecoflex 
5.4 20.1 
ATVS [41] 9.0 30.1 
Anonymous [41] 16.0 32.8 
Anonymous2 [41] 16.0 13.2 
Dermalog [39] 
Gelatin, latex, Play-Doh, white glue, 
silicone, ecoflex 
0.8 42.5 
Greenbit [39] 39.5 38.8 
Federico [39] 24.5 26.6 
CASIA [39] 24.8 29.63 
LBP pores detection 
[68] 11.13 13.30 
Power spectrum [68] 24.65 41.40 
Wavelet energy [68] 39.03 27.53 
Ridges wavelet [68] 41.34 30.58 
Valleys walevet [68] 38.81 10.08 
Curvelet energy [68] 40.70 31.08 
Curvelet GLCM [68] 22.15 27.88 
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Table 3. Software PAD performance with self-declared results and evaluations. Results 
were gathered from [47]. 
Algorithm/author PAI species APCER (%) 
BPCER 
(%) 
Nikam and Agarwal [69] Gelatin, Play-Doh, plastic, silicone sealant, Putty, alginate 2.08 1.62 
Nikam and Agarwal [70] Gelatin, Play-Doh 2.5 2.16 
Nikam and Agarwal [71] Gelatin, Play-Doh 2.5 2.16 
Espinoza and Champod 
[48] Latex 21.2 8.3 
Galbally et al. [72] Gelatin, Play-Doh, silicone 6.27 6.85 
Pereira et al. [73] White glue, silicon 3.47 10.52 
Marasco and Sansone 
[53] 
Gelatin, latex, Play-Doh, white glue, 
silicone, ecoflex 12.3 12.63 
Nikam and Agarwal [74] Gelatin, Play-Doh 3.33 1.62 
Nikam and Agarwal [75] Gelatin, Play-Doh 3.33 1.62 
Tan and Schuckers [51] Gelatin, Play-Doh 6.0 2.28 
Marasco and Sansone 
[76] 
Gelatin, latex, Play-Doh, white glue, 
silicone, ecoflex 12.3 12.63 
Decann et al. [77] Gelatin, Play-Doh, silicon 1.2 1.2 
Tan and Schuckers [55] Gelatin, Play-Doh, silicon 0.9 0.9 
Nikam and Agarwal [78] Gelatin, Play-Doh 0.9 2.08 
Jia and Cai [79] Gelatin 4.49 4.49 
Antonelli et al. [56] Gelatin, latex, white glue, RTV silicon 11.24 11.24 
Zhang et al. [57] Silicon 4.5 4.5 
Jia et al. [80] Gelatin 4.78 4.78 
 
As it can be noticed, results that are self-reported have much lower error rates than 
those that went through an independent evaluation using the same methods. The 
average APCER for the independent evaluations of software solutions is 31.12%, while 
the BPCER is 25.98%. On the other hand, the APCER average for self-declared results 
is 5.74% and the BPCER is 5.09%.  
On the hardware side, there are scarce reports on results, few databases exist and 
those that do are very small. In these cases, the evaluation results have been self-
declared. APCER and BPCER (whenever possible to find) are shown on Table 4. 
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Table 4. Hardware PAD performance. 
Hardware 
method Authors PAI species 
APCER 
(%) 
BPCER 
(%) 
OCT 
Cheng and Larin [81], 
[82] 
Sousedik, Breithaupt, 
Busch [83] 
 
Menrath and 
Breithaupt [84] 
Nasiri-Avanaki et al. 
[67] 
White glue, silicon, 
household cement 
Glycerol, graphite, 
window paint 
 
? 
Sellotape 
- 
11.32 
(50% T) 
6.17 
- 
- 
3.52 
(50% T) 
25.37 
- 
Challenge-
response 
Wei-Yun et al. [59] Gelatin 0 0 
Odor analysis Baldiserra et al. [60] Gelatin, latex, RTV silicon - - 
Pulse oximetry Reddy et al. [85] Hengfoss et al. [86] 
Gelatin, Play-Doh 
Cadaver 
0 
- 
0 
- 
Multispectral 
Ratha and Govindaraju 
[64] 
Lumidigm 
Chang et al. [87] 
Gelatin, gold latex, clay, 
green gummy 
Silicon 
- 
 
- 
- 
- 
 
- 
- 
 
Those results that show a zero percent error rate are probably due to not having 
done an extensive evaluation, but only a concept proposal and trial with few users. 
Studies on Optical Coherence Tomography (OCT) have been more complete and, in 
general, adapted to ISO/IEC 30107-3. Although some reports show promising results 
for such technologies, there are some drawbacks: 
• OCT: expensive (thousands of euros), needs a few seconds to capture the 
fingerprint (0.02s for a genuine finger [88] or up to 56s for another case [84]) 
and the finger has to stay very still because it is easy to get disturbances. There 
are two commercial products from IDEMIA [89] and THORLABS [90], but no 
evaluation results are published. 
• Challenge-response: in this case, the user is given a tactile pattern on the 
reader surface and he/she needs to identify the pattern as a response. The 
problem is that the system is difficult to use, as the user cannot reliably perceive 
the proposed pattern. Also, it is uncomfortable for the user due to the currents 
sent to the finger. 
• Odor analysis: although it works well with fake finger materials like silicone, 
others are difficult to identify because the sensor’s response is similar to that 
obtained in the presence of human skin (for instance, with gelatin). 
• Pulse oximetry: users must hold their finger for up to four seconds until the 
pulse sample is obtained and it does not work with thin materials, as pulse can 
be transmitted. 
• Multispectral: although it has been claimed that this solution is very efficient, 
this present work shows that only one wavelength may be enough to distinguish 
fake from real fingerprints, simplifying the hardware needed. Also, the solutions 
noted on Table 4 are commercial and not academic, so the results are not public. 
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Chapter 4. Presentation Attack 
Detection evaluation methodology and 
studies 
______________________ 
 
AS IT WAS mentioned in previous sections, there are currently tools and 
methodologies to perform PAD evaluations, such as the standards ISO/IEC JTC1/SC37 
30107 [1], [2] and ISO/IEC JTC1/SC27 19989 [91] or Common Criteria’s Common 
Evaluation Methodology (CEM) [18]. The PAD experiments carried out during this 
Thesis cover desktop and mobile device fingerprint sensors. Both cases have inherent 
differences, so the PAD evaluation methodology slightly differs for each case. For the 
case of desktop readers, ISO/IEC 30107 Part 3 – Testing and reporting was used to 
report the obtained results. Although at this moment there exists a new part of that 
standard dedicated especially for mobile devices (Part 4 – Profile for evaluation of 
mobile devices), there was not at the time of performing the experiments of this Thesis 
and reporting them. Thus, a new methodology was designed and applied with the 
purpose of bringing PAD evaluation to the case of mobile devices, which is the focus of 
this chapter. This became a contribution to the said standard. 
The main structure of the methodology stems from Common Criteria, as it was 
gathered in a best practices document [19], where the security issues were adapted due 
to the inherent nature of biometric recognition systems. Moreover, the attack potential 
concept was also taken from CEM [18] and subdivided into more specific steps based 
on ISO/IEC 19989 [91]. ISO/IEC 30107 – Biometric presentation attack detection [1] 
was in an early stage when this work started, but it already included many useful report 
metrics and report factors that shall be included in a PAD evaluation. Nevertheless, 
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some aspects of this standard could not apply to mobile devices, mainly because the 
evaluator does not have access to decision policies on scores, quality, transactions, etc. 
Thus, some characteristics from a work on performance evaluation focused on mobile 
devices [21] were also added to the final methodology. A combination of the 
aforementioned best practices, standards and methodologies plus the experience 
gained on performing evaluations gave way to the methodology proposed on this 
Thesis by the author. Moreover, these contributions were discussed and accepted in 
the new part of standard ISO/IEC 30107, Part 4: Profile for evaluation of mobile 
devices. The influences of each methodology and standard are shown on Figure 10. 
 
Figure 10. New methodology developed for testing PAD in mobile devices. 
The resulting methodology will be detailed along this chapter and, as it will be seen 
in Chapter 5, Chapter 6 and Chapter 7, it will be followed on every PAD evaluation on 
desktop and mobile devices. 
First, as for every security evaluation according to Common Criteria, three steps are 
needed: planning, execution and results reporting. Each of them entails a subset of 
phases, gathered in Figure 11. These will be detailed in the upcoming subsections of 
this chapter. 
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Figure 11. Steps needed for biometric evaluations. 
4.1 Planning the evaluation 
When planning a PAD evaluation, specific steps should be made, as detailed as 
possible, so that the later execution runs smoothly. Evaluators need to make sure that 
they have considered as many details as possible. For this end, three steps are needed: 
identification of all possible threats and attacks that may exploit the vulnerabilities of 
the system, analysis of potential attacks and specification of penetration test. 
4.1.1 Identification of all possible threats and attacks 
The steps that shall be followed to identify all possible threats and attacks to the 
system are: description of the Target of Evaluation (TOE), description of the target 
application, search of possible threats and definition of the corresponding attacks. 
4.1.1.1 Description of TOE (Target of Evaluation) 
The first step of this phase is to describe the system that will be put to the test. Thus, 
the Target of Evaluation (TOE) should be described in terms of: 
• Type of biometric system and its elements (Figure 6). The relevant 
characteristic in this case is the level of evaluation of the PAD mechanism. 
According to ISO/IEC 30107-3, these can be PAD subsystem, data capture 
subsystem or full system. These were detailed on 2.3.2. 
• Characteristics such as modality, sensing technology and/or type of 
algorithm.   
 
(3) Results
Penetration test Vulnerability test
(2) Execution
Detection Capture Processing
(1) Planning
Identify threats and 
attacks
Analysis of potential 
attacks
Penetration test 
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4.1.1.2 Description of target application 
A PAD evaluation has no meaning or purpose unless the target evaluation and the 
conditions under which it is performed are specified, as they are key elements to search 
and classify possible threats and corresponding attacks. Thus, the following 
descriptions are needed: 
• Target application and elements and conditions of the operational 
environment. A distinction between impostor (subject intends to be 
recognized as a specific, targeted individual known to the system) and 
concealer (attacker seeks to conceal his/her own biometric characteristics) 
attacks is relevant here. Conditions in a mobile device access or in an 
Automatic Border Control (ABC) system are different: for the former, it is 
an impostor attack case, as the attacker tries to access a phone that does not 
belong to him or her by reproducing the owner’s biometric characteristics; 
for the latter, both cases could happen, as the attacker could try to 
impersonate someone else, or he/she could try to conceal their real 
fingerprints to avoid a black list he/she is a part of. 
• Implemented functions and their policies: enrollment, verification and/or 
identification. The policies can cover number of allowed presentation 
attempts, maximum duration or decision-making after all attempts have 
failed.  
4.1.1.3 Search of threats and corresponding attacks 
Based on the description of the TOE and the target application, threats and attacks 
can be found. Every threat has at least one corresponding possible attack [18] and they 
shall be analyzed before defining the penetration test. 
4.1.1.3.1 Search possible threats 
Desktop and mobile device fingerprint sensors can have vulnerabilities at many 
points, and they shall be analyzed. For that, the evaluator should study the intended 
operation of the system and then think how an attacker could manipulate and take 
advantage of it. The only vulnerable point used for the scope of this Thesis is the 
capture process (attack presentations). 
4.1.1.3.2 Define possible attacks 
After the possible threats have been found, the corresponding attacks can be 
determined. These attacks shall be described in detail (for this case, source of the 
biometric characteristic, methods to create the mold and the artefact), following 
ISO/IEC 30107 Parts 3 [1] and 4 [2]. In this scope, the attack that can exploit the threat 
explained in the previous point is the presentation attack, i.e., using an artefact 
generated from a user’s real finger. The biometric characteristic can be obtained in two 
ways: with or without cooperation from the capture subject, namely, cooperative and 
non-cooperative attacks.  
In addition, the expertise of the attacker and effort expended in preparing and 
performing the attacks shall be specified, but this matter will be detailed in the next 
section covering attack potential calculations. 
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4.1.2 Analysis of potential attacks 
The Attack Potential is a standardized measure given by Common Criteria. 
According to Common Criteria methodology [18], the attack potential is a measure of 
the effort to be expended in attacking a TOE (Target of Evaluation) with a PAI 
(Presentation Attack Instrument), expressed in terms of an attacker’s expertise, 
resources and motivation, which can be divided into more specific parameters. Thus, 
TOEs are given a rating to assess their resistance to specific attacks. 
A score can be assigned to each of the mentioned parameters following CEM’s table 
(Table 5). By adding all the values from the different parameters, the attack potential 
of an PAI species is rated as Basic, Enhanced-Basic, Moderate, High or Beyond high 
(Table 6). Once this rating is known, the corresponding attack resistance can be 
obtained (No rating, Basic, Enhanced-basic, Moderate or High). 
Table 5. Calculation of attack potential. Each category is assigned a value according to 
this table [18]. 
Factor Value Factor Value 
Elapsed time Knowledge of TOE 
<= 1 day 0 Public 0 
<= 1 week 1 Restricted 3 
<= 2 weeks 2 Sensitive 7 
<= 1 month 4 Critical 11 
<= 2 months 7 Window of opportunity 
<= 3 months 10 Unnecessary / unlimited access 0 
<= 4 months 13 Easy 1 
<= 5 months 15 Moderate 4 
<= 6 months 17 Difficult 10 
> 6 months 19 None  
Expertise Equipment 
Layman 0 Standard 0 
Proficient 3 Specialized 4 
Expert 6 Bespoke 7 
Multiple experts 8 Multiple bespoke 9 
 
Table 6. Rating of vulnerabilities and TOE resistance [18]. 
Values Attack potential required to 
exploit scenario: 
TOE resistant to attackers with 
attack potential of: 
0 – 9 Basic No rating 
10 – 13 Enhanced-basic Basic 
14 – 19 Moderate Enhanced-basic 
20 – 24 High Moderate 
=> 25 Beyond High High 
 
Once the attacks are defined, the penetration test can be designed as a conclusion 
to the evaluation planning. 
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4.1.3 Specification of penetration test 
The penetration test shall describe the complete procedure to conduct each attack. 
In this case, ISO/IEC 30107-3 [92] gives guidelines on which information must be 
included, namely: 
• number of presentation attack instruments, PAI species, and PAI series used 
in the evaluation; 
• number of test subjects involved in the testing, including those unable to 
utilize artefacts or present non-conformant characteristics; 
• number of artefacts created per test subject for each material tested; 
• number of sources from which artefact characteristics were derived; 
• number of tested materials; 
• description of output information available from PAD mechanism; 
• ordering of subject presentations with and without PAI, and whether 
subjects were reused; and 
• ordering of subject presentations to the PAD enabled and disabled system, 
and whether subjects were reused. 
4.2 Execution of the evaluation 
After the careful planning of the evaluation, it can be finally executed. For that, 
different penetration tests need to be carried out and, as it was mentioned previously, 
in this Thesis we will focus on presentation attacks. The biometric system shall be 
attacked as many times as addressed in the previous phase. The execution has three 
phases: detection, capture and processing. 
4.2.1 Detection 
Several trials should be made with different materials to check if the sensor can 
detect the artefact. If it does, then the material can be selected for the evaluation. 
Although, if there is any sign that a modification to the artefact or presentation method 
could work, the evaluator shall try to find it. If the evaluator realizes that some specific 
behavior helps the artefact to get through the system, it should be applied to the rest of 
the evaluation [92]. Hence, the evaluator can improve his or her skills during the 
evaluation. 
4.2.2 Capture 
In the same way as in the detection phase, if the system provides any indication that 
the PAI is being captured successfully, evaluators must analyze the situation and 
consider whether a modification to the building process or usage could improve the 
attack successes. If it does, the procedure should be applied to the rest of the 
penetration test. 
4.2.3 Processing 
As the last step, evaluators shall check whether the system is able to process the 
acquired sample, that is, whether features can be obtained from it and can be compared 
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to one or more samples (verification or identification, respectively). These can be 
quality results, similarity scores or pass/fail results.  
4.3 Results reporting 
Lastly, once the evaluation has been executed, all the gathered data should be put 
together and analyzed. Also, based on the outcomes that arose from the penetration 
test, a list of vulnerabilities shall be reported, along with the consequences that may 
derive from successful attacks. 
4.3.1 Vulnerability test results 
Once all the data has been analyzed for the penetration test, the evaluator shall 
report which PAI species were successful on each specific device to report their 
vulnerabilities to presentation attacks. Also, the consequences that may derive from a 
successful attack shall be explained.  
4.3.2 Penetration test results 
As explained on 2.3, the standard ISO/IEC 30107-3 requires specific reporting 
metrics for PAD evaluations. On the experiments of this Thesis, the possible metrics 
are APNRR, APAR, and IAPMR, depending on the level of access of the evaluator 
(Figure 12). 
 
Figure 12. Metrics used for each case. Desktop fingerprint sensors give us more 
intermediate decisions than mobile devices. 
4.3.1 Molds and artefacts 
As it happens with cooking, every evaluator has different abilities to generate 
artefacts and it is very difficult to compare one’s expertise to another. Therefore, the 
results of the PAD evaluation are dependent on who the attacker is, as it will be shown 
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with evaluation results in Chapter 6. Thus, for a report, it is a good practice to include 
images of molds, artefacts and sample images used in the evaluation. 
4.4 PAD evaluation studies overview 
The goal of this part of the document is to give an outline of the experiments made 
following this methodology and the storyline that binds them all together. In the 
context of presentation attack detection evaluations, the main goal was to assess the 
influence of different factors: different types of devices (desktop and mobile), PAI 
species (materials) used to create fake fingers, how many attackers tried spoofing those 
devices, the level of cooperation from the capture subject and the evaluator’s access to 
the biometric system. 
For that end, five different studies were performed sequentially, each with a 
different question in mind and as follow-ups to the previous: 
• Study 1: how easy is it to successfully attack off-the-shelf desktop sensors with 
readily available materials, both with and without cooperation from the capture 
subject? 
• Study 2: mobile devices with an embedded fingerprint reader are widely used 
nowadays, but no public PAD evaluations have been performed on them. How 
would the most successful cooperative PAI species from Study 1 work on mobile 
devices? 
• Study 3: once cooperative attacks have been tried on mobile devices, can we 
have a more real-life approach and try with the non-cooperative ones? Can we 
find the easiest approach for stealing latent fingerprints from a phone screen? 
• Study 4: our intuition says that different attackers would get different results, 
as would different chefs with the same recipe. Thus, would different attackers 
with the same recipe, methods and time, get the same results? Would they get 
similar results to those of the experimented attackers? 
• Study 5: Having 12 hours to attack a mobile device, how many attacks will be 
successful, having non-experienced attackers? What new PAI species can be 
found? 
An overview of the differences between each study and the evaluation 
characteristics can be seen on Figure 13, and the reader can use it as a continuous 
reference. The meaning of each symbol can be found at the beginning of this document, 
in the List of Symbols. Every study will be explained in detail throughout the next two 
chapters. 
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Figure 13. Overview of all carried out PAD evaluation studies. 
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Chapter 5. Presentation Attack 
Detection evaluation of desktop 
fingerprint sensors 
______________________ 
 
AS IT WAS seen on the studies outline of the previous section (Figure 13), Study 1 
comprises an experiment made with 4 desktop fingerprint sensors of different 
technologies. The goal was to perform a PAD evaluation on desktop commercial 
readers to see their ability to reject artefacts made of several materials. In total, 4,672 
attacks were attempted using 7 different PAI species (fake finger material). Both 
cooperative and non-cooperative tests were made, and the results were reported 
according to ISO/IEC 30107-3 metrics. As it was mentioned on Chapter 4, the steps for 
carrying out an evaluation are planning, execution and results reporting. These will be 
addressed throughout the subsections of this chapter. An overview of the study can be 
seen on Figure 14. 
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Figure 14. Overview of Study 1 characteristics. 
5.1 Planning 
As detailed on Chapter 4, the methodology used for this study (as with the rest) 
follows evaluation methods from Common Criteria’s CEM and ISO/IEC 30107-3. All 
the steps explained in the general methodology will be addressed for each study in 
Chapter 5 and Chapter 6. 
An expert performed an evaluation on 1 thermal, 2 capacitive and 1 optical sensors. 
The SDKs used for the capture application did not have PAD mechanisms deactivated, 
that is, the configuration was the same used for performance evaluations. The process 
used to create the artefacts was the usual one seen in many evaluations and research 
on PAD [13], both cooperative (capture subject cooperates in the creation of the mold) 
and non-cooperative (attacker steals biometric characteristic with no help from 
capture subject). For this study, it was important to try many PAI species (i.e. Play-
Doh, gelatin, latex, silicone, white glue, latex with graphite and silicone with graphite) 
to check which ones were more threatening to the systems. Details of the step 
“Identification of all possible threats and attacks” can be found on Table 7 and Table 8. 
The enrollment and verification policies rely on quality outcomes, using the NIST 
Fingerprint Image Quality (NFIQ) algorithm. This measurement ranges from 1 to 5, 1 
being the highest quality and 5 being the lowest. For this evaluation, samples with an 
NFIQ of 3 or lower get successfully acquired by the system. Consequently, samples with 
an NFIQ of 5 get rejected. 
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Table 7. Identification of all possible threats and attacks: description of TOE. 
Sensors 
Thermal 
Resolution 385 dpi 
Image capture area 11.9 x 16.9 mm 
Fingerprint image size 180 x 256 px 
Capacitive 1 
Resolution 363 dpi 
Image capture area 10.6 x 14 mm 
Fingerprint image size 152 x 200 px 
Capacitive 2 
Resolution 508 dpi 
Image capture area 12.8 x 18 mm 
Fingerprint image size 256 x 360 px 
Optical 
Resolution 508 dpi 
Image capture area 12.9 x 16.8 mm 
Fingerprint image size 258 x 336 px 
Evaluator’s access 
Grey box (NFIQ quality score) 
Full system 
No PAD implemented 
 
Table 8. Identification of all possible threats and attacks: description of target 
application. 
Applications 
No particular application for this evaluation, e.g. entering an 
office, spending food coupons, accessing critical infrastructures, 
etc. 
Consequences of 
successful attack 
Unauthorized person entering an office, access to privileges that 
do not belong to person, unauthorized person fiddling with 
critical infrastructure. 
Implemented 
functions 
Enrollment:  
• 2 transactions with NFIQ <= 3 (good quality) 
• 3 attempts per transaction until both images 
successfully compared (NBIS algorithm) 
• If after 3 attempts, no successful comparisons between 2 
samples -> no enrollment 
• Threshold for ground truth: 20 (NBIS algorithm) 
Verification:  
• Offline. NBIS algorithm comparison 
• 2 transactions with NFIQ <= 3 (good quality) 
• 3 attempts per transaction until both images 
successfully compared (NBIS algorithm) 
• Threshold for ground truth: 20 (NBIS algorithm) 
 
The procedure for creating the molds and artefacts has been widely reported on the 
literature [7], [10], [13], [45], so only a brief summary will be given here. For 
cooperative attacks, the capture subject presses his or her finger on a silicone ball for 
around 5 minutes, until it hardens. That will be the mold. To create the artefact, 
materials are pressed or spread across the mold for a given time. For non-cooperative 
attacks, the capture subject leaves a trace of his or her fingerprint on a surface. The 
shape is enhanced by brushing ink powder on it, and a high-quality photo is taken. This 
picture is digitally enhanced with freely available software and printed on a transparent 
sheet. This sheet will then be laid on a PCB (printed circuit board) that can be 
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developed to obtain a 3D mold. Lastly, the same steps as with the cooperative attacks 
are followed to build an artefact. Some steps can be seen on Figure 15 and Figure 16. 
    
(a) (b) (c) (d) 
Figure 15. Process for obtaining molds: a) Cooperative silicon mold after having a 
pressed finger, b) fingerprints printed on transparent sheet, c) PCB board being 
developed and d) resulting non-cooperative PCB mold.  
    
(e) (f) (g) (h) 
Figure 16. Resulting artefacts: e) Play-Doh artefact, f) gelatin artefact on a non-
cooperative mold, g) latex with graphite artefact and h) latex artefact on a cooperative 
mold during the drying process. 
5.1.1 Analysis of Attack Potential 
As it was explained on Chapter 4 Section 4.1.2 Analysis of Attack Potential, the 
attack potential is a measure of the effort to be expended in attacking a TOE with a PAI, 
expressed in terms of an attacker’s expertise, resources and motivation, which can be 
divided into more specific parameters. In this way, TOEs are given a rating to assess 
their resistance to specific attacks. As explained previously, every threat has a 
corresponding attack. The particular case for this study can be seen on Table 9. 
Table 9. Planning: Analysis of attack potential by searching threats and their 
corresponding attacks (study on desktop sensors). 
Possible 
threats 
• Only presentation attack: using an artefact generated from a user’s real 
finger on the reader. 
• Intended operation of the system: depends on the target application, e.g. 
opening a door to an office or to a gym or getting privileges like food 
coupons. 
Possible 
attacks 
• Corresponding attack: presentation attack.  
• Biometric characteristic can be obtained with or without cooperation 
from the capture subject. In this case, both were done.  
• Level of expertise of the evaluator: proficient, although the materials 
needed for the evaluation can be found at any supermarket. 
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5.1.1.1 Attack Potential calculation 
This calculation is used by the evaluator to determine whether or not the TOE is 
resistant to attacks assuming a specific attack potential of an attacker [18]. If the 
evaluator determines that a potential vulnerability is exploitable in the fingerprint 
sensor, they must confirm that it is exploitable by doing penetration tests (as specified 
on Section 4.1.2). 
With this in mind, the evaluator determines the minimum attack potential required 
by an attacker to successfully carry on an attack and arrives at some conclusion about 
the TOE's resistance to attacks. This attack potential is confirmed on the penetration 
tests performed in this work on subsection 5.1.2. 
As explained on Chapter 4, a score can be assigned to each of the attack potential 
parameters. By adding all the values, the attack potential of an PAI species is rated as 
Basic, Enhanced-Basic, Moderate, High or Beyond high. 
Following CEM specifications, a score was given to every parameter of the attack 
potential to calculate its total rating (each score is given according to the table on [18]. 
The attack potential will be different for cooperative and non-cooperative attacks, 
being the expertise and the elapsed time the most differentiating factors, as can be seen 
on Table 10 and Table 11. As all the materials used for this experiment were readily 
available and easy to use, all of them sum up the same attack potential score. 
Table 10. Attack Potential calculation for cooperative attacks on desktop fingerprint 
sensors. Scores assigned according to the classification from Common Criteria [18, p. 
429]. 
COOPERATIVE ATTACKS 
 
Preparation phase 
PAI construction + 
exercising phase 
Attack 
execution 
phase 
Total factor 
rating 
Score 
Elapsed time 
<1 day (capture subject is 
cooperative) 
<1 day or <1 week 
(different material 
difficulty) 
Few seconds 
(perform attack) 
<1 week or 
<2 weeks 
1.5 
Expertise 
Layman (information about 
effective materials is widely 
available on the internet) 
Layman (easy to create) Layman (not 
much expertise 
needed) 
Layman 0 
Knowledge of TOE 
Public (well known on the 
internet that it works) 
Public (manuals can be 
found on the internet) 
Public (no 
knowledge 
needed) 
Public 0 
Window of opportunity 
Unnecessary (no access to 
TOE needed) 
Easy (access to TOE for 
practicing) 
Depends on 
scenario 
Easy 1 
Equipment 
Standard (materials easy to 
obtain in supermarkets or 
online) 
Specialized (some 
sensors might be hard to 
obtain for practicing) 
Standard (no 
equipment 
needed) 
Specialized 4 
Overall attack rating 6.5 (Basic) 
Attack resistance Minimum 
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Table 11. Attack Potential calculation for non-cooperative attacks on desktop fingerprint 
sensors. Scores assigned according to the classification from Common Criteria [18, p. 
429]. 
NON-COOPERATIVE ATTACKS 
 
Preparation phase 
PAI construction + 
exercising phase 
Attack 
execution 
phase 
Total factor 
rating 
Score 
Elapsed time 
<1 week (capture subject is 
non-cooperative) 
1 week (creating 
PAIs) 
Few seconds 
(perform attack) 
<2 weeks 2 
Expertise 
Layman (information about 
effective materials is widely 
available on the internet) 
Proficient (process 
needs many steps) 
Layman (not 
much expertise 
needed) 
Proficient 3 
Knowledge of TOE 
Public (well known on the 
internet that it works) 
Public (manuals can 
be found on the 
internet) 
Public (no 
knowledge 
needed) 
Public 0 
Window of opportunity 
Unnecessary (no access to 
TOE needed) 
Easy (access to TOE 
for practicing) 
Depends on 
scenario 
Easy 1 
Equipment 
Standard (materials easy to 
obtain in supermarkets or 
online, but it takes time to learn 
the procedure) 
Specialized (some 
sensors might be 
hard to obtain) 
Standard (no 
equipment 
needed) 
Specialized 4 
Overall attack rating 10 (Enhanced-basic) 
Attack resistance Basic 
 
As it was calculated on Table 10 and Table 11, the rating for cooperative attacks on 
desktop fingerprint readers is 6.5 (basic) and 10 (enhanced-basic) for the non-
cooperative. Thus, the attacks would have to be considered in penetration testing for 
all evaluations assuming, respectively, Minimum and Basic attack potentials (or 
higher). If penetration tests show that the attack is successful, the TOE would fail to 
resist against that attack potential.  
5.1.2 Specification of penetration test 
Once the TOE has been analyzed and described, the penetration test can be 
planned. A comparison with the rest of the studies was given in Section 4.4, if context 
is wanted. 
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Table 12. Penetration test characteristics for the study on desktop sensors. 
 Cooperative attacks Non cooperative attacks 
Sensors 1 thermal, 2 capacitive, 1 optical 
1 thermal, 2 capacitive 
Capture subjects 6 (4 male, 2 female) 
Sources per capture 
subject (fingers) 6 (index, middle and thumb from both hands) 
Total sources (fingers) 36 (not all sources used for all PAI species) 
Attempts per finger 3 
Total attempts 2,520 2,668 
Sessions 2 for bona fide (15 days apart), 1 for attacks 
PAI species 7 (Silicone, silicone + graphite, gelatin, latex, latex + graphite, Play-Doh, white glue) 
Molds Silicone 
Evaluator’s access Grey box (NFIQ quality score, pass/fail result) 
Evaluator number and 
expertise 1 expert 
 
For the data collection, an app was developed for the capture process. As it can be 
seen on Figure 17, the program showed which finger to capture, the number of attempts 
and samples left and an image of the captured fingerprint. It allowed both an 
enrollment and verification process. 
 
Figure 17. Example display of the desktop capture program. 
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5.2 Execution 
As it was explained on Section 4.2, the execution can be done once the penetration 
test has been specified. It comprises three phases: detection, capture and processing. 
5.2.1 Detection 
Before the actual execution, the different PAI species were put to the test. If the 
sensor could detect the fingerprint, then it could be selected for the evaluation.  
5.2.2 Capture 
As checking the quality is not always possible for the evaluator, some artefacts with 
different qualities (examined by the evaluator) can be used to check which ones are 
obtained successfully by the sensor, and continue with that technique [93]. For desktop 
capture devices, the quality of the sample could be measured with NFIQ and an image 
of the sample could be seen at the moment of capture. Thus, it was possible for the 
evaluator to improve the attack during the evaluation. It also must be noted that 
different artefacts work better on sensors with different technologies: transparent 
PAIs, in general, do not work well on optical sensors because of the light scattering; 
non-conductive PAIs do not work on capacitive sensors. 
It was observed that, depending on the environmental conditions, some materials 
behave differently. In hot weather (25 degrees Celsius or more), Play-Doh and gelatin 
artefacts are very difficult to use, as they lose their shape in seconds, sometimes before 
reaching the reader. On the other hand, latex becomes softer and more moist, so it 
becomes conductive and is thus detected by capacitive sensors. 
5.2.3 Processing 
In the case of desktop fingerprint capture devices, all images were stored for an 
offline verification with the database of subjects’ real fingers by using the NBIS 
algorithm by NIST [94]. The most significant values from the analysis were the 
proportion of times that an artefact was verified as a bona fide presentation and the 
proportion of images that were rejected by the system due to low quality (NFIQ > 4).  
5.3 Results 
After the penetration test is executed, the results from the PAD evaluation can be 
obtained and analyzed. As it was explained on Section 4.3.2, the metrics that can be 
reported for this study are APNRR, APAR and IAPMR (Figure 18). This is valid for all 
sensors. 
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Figure 18. Results reporting metrics, according to ISO/IEC 30107-3. This applies to all 
sensors. 
As having successful PAIs is an undesirable outcome, the number of successful 
attacks will be represented in red, while unsuccessful attacks will be shown in green in 
all graphs. 
5.3.1 Penetration test results 
This subsection is divided into cooperative and non-cooperative attacks. While 
cooperative attacks were performed on all readers (one thermal, two capacitive and 
one optical), for the case of non-cooperative attacks the optical was not used. This is 
due to having carried out two separate studies and adding the optical sensor only on 
the second one, where only cooperative attacks were done. 
5.3.1.1 Cooperative attacks 
As explained on previous sections, cooperative attacks require the collaboration of 
the capture subject to obtain his or her fingerprints. This is done by laying his or her 
finger on a material for a specific amount of time until the shape is transferred to the 
mold. Thus, in general, samples obtained in this manner should attain a higher quality. 
For this reason, an image quality analysis will be shown, measured with NIST 
Fingerprint Image Quality (NFIQ). The policy for verification based on NFIQ was 
covered on subsection 5.1. The quality analysis for each PAI species and device, along 
with sample images obtain for each case, are shown on Table 13 -Table 19. In those 
cases where there is no image, it means that the sensor could not detect the artefact or 
acquire any sample. Moreover, not all samples shown on the table resulted in a 
successful acquirement, as many of them obtained an NFIQ of 5.  
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Table 13. NFIQ distribution by sensor for cooperative attacks, for the case of gelatin. 
Material NFIQ distribution Sensor 
Gelatin 
 
Thermal 
 
Capacitive 1 
 
Capacitive 
2 
 
Optical 
 
Table 14. NFIQ distribution by sensor for cooperative attacks, for the case of Play-Doh. 
Material NFIQ distribution Sensor 
Play-Doh 
 
Thermal 
 
Capacitive 1 
 
Capacitive 
2 
 
Optical 
 
Table 15. NFIQ distribution by sensor for cooperative attacks, for the case of latex. 
Material NFIQ distribution Sensor 
Latex 
 
Thermal 
 
Capacitive 1 
 
Capacitive 
2 
- 
Optical 
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Table 16. NFIQ distribution by sensor for coop. attacks, for the case of latex+graphite. 
Material NFIQ distribution Sensor 
Latex with 
graphite 
 
Thermal 
 
Capacitive 1 
 
Capacitive 
2 
 
Optical 
 
Table 17. NFIQ distribution by sensor for cooperative attacks, for the case of silicone. 
Material NFIQ distribution Sensor 
Silicone 
 
Thermal 
 
Capacitive 1 
 
Capacitive 
2 
- 
Optical 
 
Table 18. NFIQ distribution by sensor for cooperative attacks, for the case of silicone 
with graphite. 
Material NFIQ distribution Sensor 
Silicone 
with 
graphite 
 
Thermal 
 
Capacitive 1 
 
Capacitive 
2 
- 
Optical 
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Table 19. NFIQ distribution by sensor for cooperative attacks, for the case of white glue. 
Material NFIQ distribution Sensor 
White 
glue 
 
Thermal 
 
Capacitive 1 
 
Capacitive 
2 
- 
Optical 
 
 
As it can be clearly seen, most artefacts obtain an NFIQ score of 5, which is the 
lowest quality. The thermal sensor is more widely distributed, having most artefacts 
divided in NFIQ 3 and 5, but also many with NFIQ 1 and 2. For capacitive reader 1, 
many images are only a completely black sample, which NFIQ considers has a score of 
5. Latex is the material which provides the best quality, but only for the thermal and 
optical devices. Gelatin and Play-Doh are the ones that obtain the best quality on 
capacitive sensors, and they are the only materials that produce a detectable sample on 
all 4 readers. 
As it was seen on Figure 18, the results report according to ISO/IEC 30107-3 must 
include IAPMR, APAR and IAPNRR. The results for the cooperative experiments can 
be seen on Figure 19. 
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Figure 19. IAPMR, IAPNMR, 1-APAR and APNRR for each PAI species and each device, 
for the case of cooperative attacks. 
The IAPMR values expose that the only material that can successfully attack all 
systems is Play-Doh, especially for the case of the optical sensor. The highest IAPMRs 
were obtained with silicone mixed with graphite, Play-Doh and white glue. 
Nevertheless, it should be noted that in the case of some PAI species, the number of 
generated artefacts is too small compared to others. This is because, according to 
ISO/IEC 30107, if a material is more easily detected by readers or it succeeds more 
times in being compared with the reference, a bigger number of artefacts of this kind 
should be created. The number of fake fingers created for each PAI species can be seen 
on Table 20. According to ISO/IEC 30107, if an PAI species is more easily detected by 
the sensors, a bigger number should be created with this technique. 
Table 20. Number of artefacts built with each material for the case of cooperative 
attacks.  
Gelatin Play-
Doh 
Latex Latex with 
graphite 
Silicone Silicone with 
graphite 
White glue 
36 42 12 48 6 24 6 
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In addition, the greater the APNRR, the better the system is at rejecting fake 
samples (by not responding when they are placed on the sensor), so in this matter, the 
thermal reader responds to the highest number of artefacts, although as stated below, 
those captured samples ended up not being successful. Systems can also reject artefacts 
due to their low quality (NFIQ higher than 3), and this ability is represented by APAR. 
In this case, the capacitive sensors were more capable of rejecting non-conductive 
samples, even when breathing on them to create a conductive layer on the surface. 
Nevertheless, most of the few samples that passed the quality check for these devices 
were verified as a real finger and, while for the case of the thermal one, the proportion 
was much smaller. 
5.3.1.2 Non-cooperative attacks 
As explained previously, non-cooperative attacks do not require the collaboration 
of the capture subject to obtain his or her fingerprints. This is done by lifting a latent 
fingerprint left behind by the capture subject and creating a 3D mold by developing a 
PCB with the biometric characteristics. Thus, in general, samples obtained in this 
manner should attain a lower quality than with cooperative attacks. For this reason, an 
image quality analysis will be shown, measured with NIST Fingerprint Image Quality 
(NFIQ). This measurement ranges from 1 to 5, 1 being the highest quality and 5 being 
the lowest. As it was detailed previously, samples with an NFIQ of 3 or lower get 
successfully acquired by the system. Consequently, samples with an NFIQ of 5 get 
rejected. The quality analysis for each PAI species and sensor, along with sample 
images obtain for each case, are shown on Table 21 -Table 27. In those cases where 
there is no image, it means that the reader could not detect the artefact or acquire any 
sample. Moreover, not all samples shown on the table resulted in a successful 
acquirement, as many of them obtained an NFIQ of 5. 
Table 21. NFIQ distribution by sensor for non-cooperative attacks, for the case of 
gelatin. 
Material NFIQ distribution Sensor 
Gelatin 
 
Thermal 
 
Capacitive 1 
 
Capacitive 
2 
 
Optical 
- 
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Table 22. NFIQ distribution by sensor for non-coop. attacks, for the case of Play-Doh. 
Material NFIQ distribution Sensor 
Play-Doh 
 
Thermal 
 
Capacitive 1 
 
Capacitive 
2 
- 
Optical 
- 
Table 23. NFIQ distribution by sensor for non-cooperative attacks, for the case of latex. 
Material NFIQ distribution Sensor 
Latex 
 
Thermal 
 
Capacitive 1 
 
Capacitive 
2 
- 
Optical 
- 
Table 24. NFIQ distribution divided by sensor for non-coop. attacks, for latex+ graphite. 
Material NFIQ distribution Sensor 
Latex with 
graphite 
 
Thermal 
- 
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- 
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Table 25. NFIQ distribution by sensor for non-coop. attacks, for the case of silicone. 
Material NFIQ distribution Sensor 
Silicone 
 
Thermal 
 
Capacitive 1 
 
Capacitive 
2 
- 
Optical 
- 
Table 26. NFIQ distribution by sensor for non-coop. attacks, for silicone with graphite. 
Material NFIQ distribution Sensor 
Silicone 
with 
graphite 
 
Thermal 
 
Capacitive 1 
 
Capacitive 
2 
- 
Optical 
- 
Table 27. NFIQ distribution by sensor for non-coop. attacks, for the case of white glue. 
Material NFIQ distribution Sensor 
White 
glue 
 
Thermal 
 
Capacitive 1 
 
Capacitive 
2 
- 
Optical 
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As it can be seen, most artefacts fall on an NFIQ score of 5, that is, the lowest quality 
of the range. The only material that could be detected by capacitive reader 2 is gelatin, 
and in the few cases that an image could be obtained, it had an NFIQ of 5. Again, the 
thermal sensor can consistently acquire samples of all the materials, minus latex with 
graphite. 
As it was seen on Figure 18, the results report according to ISO/IEC 30107-3 must 
include IAPMR, APAR and IAPNRR. The results for the non-cooperative experiments 
can be seen on Figure 20. 
 
Figure 20. IAPMR, IAPNMR, 1-APAR and APNRR for each PAI species and each device, 
for the case of non-cooperative attacks. 
As it can be observed, non-cooperative attacks were only successful on the thermal 
reader. On capacitive sensor 1, most artefacts were rejected due to quality (high 1 – 
APAR), while on capacitive sensor 2 they were rejected because they were not detected 
at all (no image was produced). 
It must be noted that in PAD evaluations described on Chapter 3, non-collaborative 
attacks were done for one finger at a time. That means that for each sample, around 10 
fake finger molds were produced. Then, the best mold of all was chosen for the attack. 
In the case of an attacker, usually only one finger is needed to enter a system, so he or 
she could focus on only creating one good mold of one finger. In the case of this study, 
6 different fingers were done on each PCB, so from each batch only 1-2 molds were of 
enough quality to create fingers, giving poor attack results. The number of artefacts for 
each PAI species can be seen on Table 28. According to ISO/IEC 30107, if an PAI 
species is more easily detected by the sensors, a bigger number should be created with 
this technique. 
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Table 28. Number of artefacts built with each material for the case of non-cooperative 
attacks. 
Gelatin Play-
Doh 
Latex Latex with 
graphite 
Silicone Silicone with 
graphite 
White glue 
30 18 24 12 24 30 6 
 
5.3.2 Vulnerability test results 
As it was explained on Section 4.3.1, once all the data has been analyzed after the 
penetration test, the evaluator shall report which PAI species were successful in 
attacking each system to report their found vulnerabilities to presentation attacks. It 
must be noted that some PAI species were used more times than others. The result for 
these experiments is shown on Table 29. 
Table 29. List of vulnerabilities of desktop sensors. It must be noted that not all PAI 
species were tried on every reader and that different numbers of attempts were 
performed on each experiment. 
PAI species Thermal Capacitive 1 Capacitive 2 Optical 
Silicone x   x 
Gelatin x  x x 
Latex x    
Latex + graphite x   x 
Silicone + graphite x   x 
Play-Doh x x x x 
White glue x    
 
The consequences that may derive from these vulnerabilities are several, because 
these kinds of readers can be used for many applications. For example, an unintended 
user could access a gym or office or, in more critical circumstances, bypass a frontier 
or a critical infrastructure. 
5.4 Conclusions 
The goal of this work was to analyze the possible vulnerabilities of desktop 
fingerprint sensors, focusing on attacks that do not need lots of expertise, performed 
with cheap materials that are readily available at supermarkets or online marketplaces. 
Moreover, at the time the work was developed, the standard ISO/IEC 30107-3 
Presentation Attack Detection evaluation was at its early stages and no evaluations 
had been performed following the last version of the document. As a consequence, 
contributions were done to the standard with the experience gained during this 
experiment. 
Although some conclusions could be obtained from the studies, a bigger database 
would be needed for some specific materials. This work was made only to get an outline 
of the possible vulnerabilities of fingerprint systems by trying 7 combinations of 
materials: silicone, gelatin, latex, latex with graphite, silicone with graphite, Play-Doh 
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and white glue. A system is considered to be breached security-wise when one single 
attack is successful, and all sensors were spoofed at least once. 
In the literature analysis of PAD evaluations described on Chapter 3, non-
collaborative attacks were done for one finger at a time. That means that for each 
sample, around 10 fake finger molds were produced. Then, the best mold of all was 
chosen for the attack. In the case of an attacker, usually only one finger is needed to 
enter a system, so he or she could focus on only creating one good mold of one finger. 
In the case of this study, 6 different fingers were done on each PCB, so from each batch 
only 1-2 molds were of enough quality to create fingers. Thus, results could be better if 
each finger mold was done repeatedly until obtaining a decent mold. 
Some materials were harmful for capture devices. White glue, for instance, was too 
harsh to be placed on the sensor. Silicone obtained good spoofing results when a lot of 
pressure was put on the reader, but if a normal force was applied, the PAD error rates 
dropped to zero. 
As it was mentioned, this study was performed in two periods, winter and summer, 
and some materials appeared to be highly influenced by this fact. Latex becomes sticky 
and wet with heat, so it is more effective spoofing capacitive sensors, as they are based 
on conductivity, so it is more effective in a warm environment. Play-Doh deforms easily 
with heat and traces get erased, while cold environments allow it to keep its shape, thus 
being more effective in a cold environment. 
5.5 Contributions and dissemination 
This study was published as a conference paper and as part of a journal paper. Also, 
it was part of the Master Thesis written by the author. 
5.5.1 Journal papers 
[95] I. Goicoechea-Telleria, R. Sanchez-Reillo, J. Liu-Jimenez, and R. Blanco-
Gonzalo, “Attack Potential Evaluation in Desktop and Smartphone Fingerprint 
Sensors: Can They Be Attacked by Anyone?,” Hindawi, vol. 2018, pp. 1–13, 2018. 
5.5.2 Conference papers 
[23]  I. Goicoechea-Telleria, B. Fernandez-Saavedra, and R. Sanchez-Reillo, “An 
Evaluation of Presentation Attack Detection of Fingerprint Biometric Systems 
applying ISO / IEC 30107-3,” in International Biometric Performance Testing 
Conference, 2016. 
5.5.3 Standardization 
[1]  ISO / IECJTC 1 / SC37, “Text of FDIS 30107-3, Information technology — 
Biometric presentation attack detection — Part 3: Testing and reporting,” ISO-IEC 
Standards, vol. 2008. 2009. 
• Contributed to the standard by clarifying concepts and adding new ones. 
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5.5.4 Others 
[96] I. Goicoechea-Telleria, “Vulnerabilities in Fingerprint Biometric Recognition,” 
Master Thesis, Carlos III University of Madrid, 2015. 
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Chapter 6. Presentation Attack 
Detection evaluation of mobile devices 
- single experts 
______________________ 
 
ON THE PREVIOUS chapter, experiments were performed to attack desktop 
fingerprint sensors. Thus, it was decided to start a series of experiments on 
smartphones with an embedded fingerprint reader, as it was a very unexplored area in 
the literature and they are widely used in society (Figure 21). For that end, 5 
smartphones were put to the test by using fake fingers built with different materials in 
a cooperative and non-cooperative way. In both cases, a single expert performed the 
experiments (a different person for studies 2 and 3).  
 
Figure 21. Reasoning for evaluations on mobile devices performed by single expert 
attackers. 
The goal of study 2 was to perform and report a PAD evaluation with cooperative 
attacks on mobile devices, which had not been done, at least publicly. The same 
Evaluation of Presentation Attack Detection under the Context of Common Criteria 
______________________ 
54 
 
experiment was performed again on study 3, but with non-cooperative attacks (Figure 
22). Moreover, a novel technique to steal a latent fingerprint from a phone screen was 
found, which is the simplest to date, and thus, probably, the most threatening. 
 
Figure 22. Overview of evaluations on mobile devices performed by expert attackers. 
The symbol legend can be found on the List of Symbols. 
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6.1 Planning 
Both PAD evaluations on mobile devices were performed on 5 smartphones with 
different embedded fingerprint readers. Their main characteristics (sensor type, shape 
and location) can be seen on Table 30, as it was shown on Section 4.1.1. As it was 
mentioned in the methodology, the steps needed for the planning are identification of 
all possible threats and their corresponding attacks.  
Table 30. Identification of all possible threats and attacks: description of TOE. 
Sensor details 
 
Mobile device 
(MD) 
Sensor 
type 
Sensor 
shape 
Sensor 
location 
Sensor 
technology 
MD1 Swipe Rectangular Front Capacitive 
MD2 Touch Circular Front Capacitive 
MD3 Touch Rectangular Front Capacitive 
MD4 Touch Rectangular Side Capacitive 
MD5 Touch Circular Back Capacitive 
Evaluator’s 
access 
Black box (pass/fail result) 
Full system 
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Table 31. Identification of all possible threats and attacks: description of target 
application. 
Applications Unlock user’s smartphone. Access apps, e.g. bank accounts, password managers, personal pictures, etc. 
Consequences 
of successful 
attack 
• Unauthorized person unlocking another person’s smartphone. 
• No oversight while being used. 
Implemented 
functions 
Enrollment:  
• Real fingers 
• Different enrollment policies: 
Mobile 
device 
Attempt policy for enrollment 
MD1 
Around 10 attempts needed (can be extended 10 more times if 
wanted). Asks the user to move finger to get different samples 
and checks it. 
MD2 
Around 15 attempts needed (10 for center part of the finger and 
5 for corners). Asks the user to move finger to get different 
samples and checks it.  
MD3 Around 20 attempts needed. Asks the user to move finger to get different samples and checks it. 
MD4 Around 20 attempts needed. Asks the user to move finger to get different samples and checks it. 
MD5 Around 6 attempts needed. It just asks the user to move the finger to get different samples but does not check it. 
Verification:  
• Artefact attempts to be verified as the real finger that has been 
previously enrolled 
• Different verification policies: 
Mobile 
device 
Allowed 
failed 
attempts 
Policy 
MD1 5 Waits for 30 seconds, can do attack again 
MD2 3 Asks for PIN (blocked sensor needs PIN to unlock) 
MD3 5 Waits for 30 seconds, can do attack again 
MD4 5 Waits for 30 seconds, can do attack again 
MD5 5 Waits for 30 seconds, can do attack again 
 
As it can be seen, devices MD1, MD3, MD4 and MD5 accept an unlimited number 
of attempts to attack them, as when 5 attempts have failed, they just wait for 30 seconds 
and the attacker can try again, with no more restrictions (as far as the author’s 
knowledge). MD2 asks for a PIN after 3 attempts. 
Also, for all cases, if the phone is turned off and the attacker wants to turn it on and 
access its data, he or she will need additional information apart from the bona-fide 
user’s fingerprint, like a PIN or a password. So, if the phone is found turned off or 
without power and the attacker does not know the user’s additional information, he or 
she will not be able to gain access. 
The procedure for creating cooperative molds and artefacts has been widely 
reported on the literature [7], [10], [13], [45], so only a brief summary will be given 
here. It is the same procedure used for cooperative attacks on desktop readers from 
Section 5.1.2. 
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For cooperative attacks, the same process that was followed for the previous 
experiments is used for creating fake fingers. For non-cooperative attacks, a novel 
approach was found for this work. When people use their phones, they constantly leave 
fingerprints on the touch screen by the sheer interaction with it. Hence, it is possible 
for an attacker to steal these fingerprints if the genuine user’s phone gets stolen. The 
technique used for acquiring these fingerprints is detailed as follows: 
1. A latent fingerprint is left by the bonafide user on the smartphone screen. 
This is done in a manner that resembles a normal usage: the user taps briefly 
his or her finger on the surface, leaving a trace (Figure 23). Then, a freely 
available scanner app is used to take a picture with flash of the latent 
fingerprint (Figure 24). As it can be seen, the latent fingerprint is already 
very clear. 
 
Figure 23. Latent fingerprints left on the surface by tapping the genuine user's finger. 
 
Figure 24. Picture with flash being taken with the attacker's camera. 
2. For removing the background and minor retouching, freely available image 
editing programs can be used (Figure 25). 
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Figure 25. (a) Picture taken with scanner app with flash, where fingerprint is already 
visible. (b) Fingerprint zoomed in. (c) Background erased with image editing program, 
result on (d). (e) Threshold adjustment and (f) final result. 
3. The mold is created by usual PCB developing techniques [13], and the 
artefacts are generated by the same methods used in non-cooperative attacks 
of Chapter 5 (Figure 26). 
  
(a) (b) 
  
(c) (d) 
Figure 26. (a) Fingerprint image printed on a transparent sheet (b) PBC board being 
developed (c) Result after etching PCB board mold (d) Play-Doh artefact on the PCB 
mold. 
A mobile app was made for iOS and Android (Figure 27). For acquiring the data, 
the visit screen is filled in by the evaluator (genuine user’s ID, attacker’s ID, device, 
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finger ID, type of attack and PAI species) and the app logs whether the attack succeeded 
or not. The enrollment was performed using the phone’s native settings procedure. 
 
 
Figure 27. Smartphone app (Android and iOS) for logging the PAD evaluation. A 
pass/fail result is logged for each attempt. 
6.1.1 Analysis of attack potential 
As it was explained on Section 4.1.2, the attack potential is a measure of the effort 
to be expended in attacking a TOE with a PAI, expressed in terms of an attacker’s 
expertise, resources and motivation, which can be divided into more specific 
parameters. In this way, TOEs are given a rating to assess their resistance to specific 
attacks, and it can be decided whether to add a PAD mechanism if these attacks are 
easy and probable. As explained previously, every threat has a corresponding attack. 
The particular case for this study can be seen on Table 32. 
Table 32. Planning: Analysis of attack potential by searching threats and their 
corresponding attacks (all studies on mobile devices). 
Possible 
threats 
• Only presentation attack: using an artefact generated from a user’s 
real finger on the sensor. 
• Intended operation of the system: unlock a smartphone, and thus 
accessing private data. 
Possible 
attacks 
• Corresponding attack: presentation attack.  
• Biometric characteristic can be obtained with or without 
cooperation from the capture subject. In this case, attacks were 
cooperative.  
• Level of expertise of the evaluator: proficient, although the materials 
needed for the evaluation can be found at any supermarket. 
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6.1.1.1 Attack Potential calculation 
Following the methodology already detailed on Section 4.1.2, the attack potential 
must be calculated to determine whether the TOE is resistant to attacks assuming a 
specific attack potential of an attacker. The calculation by score assignment for both 
studies can be seen on Table 33 and Table 34, respectively. 
Table 33. Attack Potential calculation for cooperative attacks on smartphone fingerprint 
sensors. 
COOPERATIVE ATTACKS 
 
Preparation phase 
PAI construction + 
exercising phase 
Attack 
execution 
phase 
Total 
factor 
rating 
Score 
Elapsed time 
<1 day (capture subject is 
cooperative) 
<1 day or <1 week 
(different material 
difficulty) 
Few seconds 
(perform attack) 
<1 week or 
<2 weeks 
1.5 
Expertise 
Layman (information on 
effective materials widely 
available on internet) 
Layman (easy to create) Layman (not 
much expertise 
needed) 
Layman 0 
Knowledge of TOE 
Public (well known on the 
internet that it works) 
Public (manuals can be 
found on the internet) 
Public (no 
knowledge 
needed) 
Public 0 
Window of opportunity 
Unnecessary (no access to 
TOE needed) 
Easy (access to TOE for 
practicing) 
Easy (no 
oversight) 
Easy 1 
Equipment 
Standard (materials easy to 
obtain at supermarkets or 
online) 
Standard (but it is 
necessary to buy the TOE, 
which can be expensive) 
Standard (no 
equipment 
needed) 
Standard 2 
Overall attack rating 4.5 (Basic) 
Attack resistance Minimum 
Table 34. Attack Potential calculation for non-cooperative attacks on smartphone 
fingerprint sensors. 
NON-COOPERATIVE ATTACKS 
 
Preparation phase 
PAI construction + 
exercising phase 
Attack 
execution 
phase 
Total 
factor 
rating 
Score 
Elapsed time 
<1 week (capture subject 
is non-cooperative) 
1 week (creating PAIs) Few seconds 
(perform attack) 
<2 weeks 2 
Expertise 
Layman (information on 
effective materials widely 
available on internet) 
Proficient (process needs 
many steps) 
Layman (not 
much expertise 
needed) 
Proficient 3 
Knowledge of TOE 
Public (well known on the 
internet that it works) 
Public (manuals can be 
found on the internet) 
Public (no 
knowledge 
needed) 
Public 0 
Window of opportunity 
Unnecessary (no access to 
TOE needed) 
Easy (access to TOE for 
practicing) 
Easy (no 
oversight) 
Easy 1 
Equipment 
Standard (materials easy to 
obtain at supermarkets or 
online) 
Standard (but it is 
necessary to buy the TOE, 
which can be expensive) 
Standard (no 
equipment 
needed) 
Standard 2 
Overall attack rating 8 (Basic) 
Attack resistance Minimum 
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The overall attack rating is 4.5 (Basic) for the cooperative attacks and 8 (Basic) for 
the non-cooperative. Thus, the attacks would have to be considered in penetration 
testing for all evaluations assuming Minimum attack potentials (or higher). If 
penetration tests show that the attack is successful, the TOE would fail to resist against 
that attack potential. 
6.1.2 Specification of penetration test 
Once the TOE has been analyzed and described, the penetration test can be 
planned. The specifics for all studies on mobile devices can be seen on Table 35. The 
expert that performed the attacks is a different person for Studies 2 and 3. 
Table 35. Penetration test characteristics for the study on smartphone sensors 
performed by expert attackers. 
 Cooperative (study 2) Non-cooperative (study 3) 
Capture subjects 7 15 
Sources per capture 
subject (fingers) 6 (index, middle and thumb from both hands) 
Total sources (fingers) 42 90 
Attempts per finger 10 
Total attempts 2,669 17,100 
Sessions 1 for bona fide 1 for attacks 
Cooperation Cooperative Non-cooperative 
PAI species 3 (Play-Doh, gelatin, latex with graphite) 
4 (Play-Doh, gelatin, latex with 
graphite, white glue with graphite) 
Molds Silicone 
Evaluator’s access Black box (pass/fail result) 
Evaluator number and 
expertise 1 expert 1 expert 
6.2 Execution 
As it was explained on Section 4.2, the execution can be done once the penetration 
test has been specified. It comprises three phases: detection, capture and processing. 
6.2.1.1 Detection 
Before the actual execution, the different PAI species were put to the test. If the 
sensor could detect the fingerprint, then it could be selected for the evaluation. 
6.2.1.2 Capture 
As checking the quality is not always possible for the evaluator, some artefacts with 
different qualities (examined by the evaluator) can be used to check which ones are 
obtained successfully by the reader and continue with that technique. Thus, the APCER 
metric given in the case of desktop sensors cannot be obtained here. In the case of 
mobile devices, some of them give a slight feedback on quality by telling the user that 
e.g. the finger is too wet. If an attacker is using a gelatin artefact and the smartphone 
prompts “finger too wet”, the attacker will create another artefact with less proportion 
of water and try again.  
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Lastly, it must be noted that each mobile device will have different algorithms, 
sensor technologies and quality and decision thresholds. 
6.2.1.3 Processing 
In the case of smartphones, being full systems with no access to intermediate data, 
no quality or similarity scores can be obtained, only pass/fail results. Thus, the data 
used for the posterior analysis was based solely on this. 
6.3 Results 
After the penetration test is executed, the results from the 4 evaluations can be 
obtained and analyzed. As it was explained on Section 4.3, the metrics to be used to 
report a full system (Figure 28) are IAPMR (Impostor Attack Presentation Match Rate) 
and its complementary, IAPNMR (Impostor Attack Presentation Non-Match Rate). 
These metrics apply to all evaluations on mobile devices. 
 
Figure 28. IAPMR and IAPNMR metrics, according to ISO/IEC 30107-3. 
As having successful PAIs is an undesirable outcome, the number of successful 
attacks will be represented in red, while unsuccessful attacks will be shown in green in 
all graphs. 
6.3.1 Penetration test results 
As it is important to obtain all the different nuances of the gathered results, several 
cases are analyzed for the penetration test:  
• Results per device 
• Results per device, per study 
• Results per device, per PAI species 
For every case, two separate graphs will be shown: IAPMR graph and fail/pass 
graph. IAPMR shows the proportion of successful attacks, but it is also important to 
discern how many attacks were performed in each case, as some experiments have far 
more attempts than others. 
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6.3.1.1 Results per device 
This subsection gathers the overall presentation attack results for all mobile devices 
tested, both studies and all PAI species. For clarification purposes, these results will be 
shown inside the corresponding mobile device. The IAPMR for each device is 
represented on Figure 29 and the number of successful and unsuccessful attacks on 
Figure 30. 
 
Figure 29. IAPMR per device, studies 2 and 3 together. 
 
 
Figure 30. Number of successful (in red) and failed (in green) attacks for each mobile 
device. Studies 2 and 3 together. 
As it can be observed, the most vulnerable mobile device overall is MD5 with a 17.1% 
of successful presentation attacks and the least vulnerable is MD4 with 3.7%. The rest 
of the mobile devices had an IAPMR of 8.7-9.8%. The smartphone with the least 
amount of attacks is MD2. This is because most attack attempts resulted in feedback 
from the system (“finger too wet”, etc.). This could be considered a quality feedback 
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which influences the final results, because the attacker can improve his or her 
technique based on these messages. 
6.3.1.2 Results per device, per study 
This subsection analyzes the difference between both studies. As it was explained 
previously, both studies are performed by an expert (a different one for each case), but 
study 2 covers cooperative attacks and study 3 non-cooperative. Thus, the results of 
each study are separated in Figure 31 and Figure 32.  
 
Figure 31. IAPMR per device (MD1-MD5) and per study (2-3). C = cooperative attacks 
(study 2) and NC = non-cooperative attacks (study 3). 
Initially, non-cooperative attacks should be less successful than cooperative ones, 
as the techniques used to obtain the fingerprint are less accurate for the former case 
(lifting a latent fingerprint versus the capture subject willingly laying the finger on a 
special mold material). Nevertheless, this difference is not clear in these studies: for 
MD1 and MD5, the cooperative attacks are clearly more successful; for MD2 and MD3, 
the success rate is very similar; for MD4, the non-cooperative attacks worked more 
times than the cooperative ones. This last outcome is due to the PAI species used: white 
glue with graphite was not used for the cooperative attacks, and it was very successful 
in attacking MD4. White glue with graphite was not good at performing attacks on 
study 1 (experiment performed on desktop sensors on Section 5.1.2), so it was not 
considered for study 2 (cooperative attacks on mobile devices). When a second expert 
laid out the penetration test for study 3 (non-cooperative attacks on mobile devices), it 
was decided to also try this material because it had been reported to work on [16].  
It must also be noted that a significantly higher number of attacks were carried out 
on study 3, with 17,100 attacks versus the 2,669 for study 2. The number of total failed 
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and successful attacks can be seen on Figure 32. This means that the evaluator could 
have obtained an increasing expertise along the experiment.  
 
Figure 32. Number of successful (in red) and failed (in green) attacks for each mobile 
device, divided by study and cooperation type.  
6.3.1.3 Results per device, per PAI species 
As it was stated previously, the common PAI species for both studies are Play-Doh, 
gelatin and latex with graphite. In addition, for study 3, white glue with graphite was 
used. The results by study and by PAI species can be observed on Figure 33 and Figure 
34. 
 
Figure 33. IAPMR per device, per study and per PAI species. C = cooperative attacks 
(study 2) and NC = non-cooperative attacks (study 3). P = Play-Doh, G = gelatin, L = latex 
with graphite and W = white glue with graphite. 
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Figure 34. Number of successful (red) and failed (green) attacks by study, device and 
PAI species. C = cooperative attacks (study 2) and NC = non-cooperative attacks (study 
3). P = Play-Doh, G = gelatin, L = latex with graphite and W = white glue with graphite. 
Play-Doh was successful at least once on both studies, all devices. Gelatin was less 
consistently successful: it did not achieve any successful attack on MD1 (study 2) and 
MD2 (study 3). Latex with graphite was successful in attacking MD2 and MD3 in both 
studies, and could not attack MD1, MD4 and MD5 for study 2. White glue with graphite 
could also hack all mobile devices, although it was only used non-cooperatively. 
Overall, it can be clearly seen that Play-Doh was very successful on MD5, obtaining an 
IAPMR of 49%.  
6.3.2 Vulnerability test results 
As it was explained on Section 4.3.1, once all the data has been analyzed after the 
penetration test, the evaluator shall report which PAI species were successful in 
attacking each system to report their found vulnerabilities to presentation attacks. The 
result for these experiments is shown on Table 36. 
Table 36. List of vulnerabilities of smartphones. Not all PAI species were tried on every 
phone and that different numbers of attempts were performed on each experiment. 
PAI species MD1 MD2 MD3 MD4 MD5 
Play-Doh x x x x x 
Gelatin x x x x x 
Latex + graphite x x x x x 
White glue + graphite x x x x x 
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As it can be seen, all mobile devices were successfully attacked at least once with all 
PAI species. The consequences that may derive from these vulnerabilities are that an 
attacker could unlock the phone and have access to all the apps that do not require 
additional security, which are most of them at the time this document was written. 
6.4 Conclusions 
In this chapter, 2 evaluations were performed on smartphones that have an 
embedded fingerprint sensor. Each study had different questions in mind. First, with 
the knowledge gathered from the evaluation of Chapter 5 with desktop readers, a PAD 
evaluation was performed on 5 smartphones with an embedded fingerprint sensor. 
This decision was taken because no previous public evaluations had been performed 
on mobile devices, which are increasingly being used in our everyday lives. The first 
evaluation was done by one expert in a cooperative manner. Then, a different expert 
performed a very similar PAD evaluation, following the same methodology and on the 
same mobile devices, but in a non-cooperative way. Moreover, a novel technique was 
used to steal fingerprints from capture subjects, simpler than any other reported on 
the literature. Throughout the process, some lessons were learnt: 
• Some devices give slight feedback of the quality (“finger too wet”, etc.). This can 
help an attacker when creating PAIs. For instance, if a gelatin artefact is used on 
a capture device and the phone shows a feedback message that says, “finger too 
wet”, the attacker with rebuild the gelatin fingers using a smaller proportion of 
water. 
• Some devices allow an unlimited number of attempts to present a sample, giving 
the attacker unlimited chances. This can be fixed by asking for additional 
information (PIN, password, another biometric modality). 
• IAPMR (Impostor Attack Presentation Match Rate) is dependent on the 
evaluator’s ability to create artefacts and on the capture subject. Thus, it is 
important to use as many attackers and capture subjects as possible when 
evaluating PAD in mobile devices. 
• MD5 uses only 6 captures for enrollment (while other devices use more than 15), 
and this could be a reason why it is more vulnerable to attacks than the others. 
• On study 3, it was found that stealing someone’s fingerprint is simpler than it 
was thought, as all 5 smartphones were successfully attacked with a non-
cooperative approach, using the most common materials from the literature. 
For all mobile devices, 3 out of 4 materials used successfully attacked the 
sensors. 
Nevertheless, it must be noted that even if an attacker can gain access to the 
smartphone, he or she will not be able to change passwords or add his or her own 
fingerprint to the system, as a PIN or password is needed for those actions. Moreover, 
if the attacker finds the smartphone when it’s shut down, he or she will also need a PIN 
or password to unlock it the first time. As a general consideration, it must be noted that 
including a fingerprint reader in smartphones greatly increased the security of mobile 
devices. The reason is that people that had never set up a PIN or password on their 
phones (due to being uncomfortable or a nuisance) started using the fingerprint sensor 
easily, adding an important layer of protection to their personal phones. 
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6.5 Contributions and dissemination 
Both studies on PAD assessment of mobile devices were published in journal and 
conference papers. Moreover, several contributions were accepted in the pertinent 
international standard ISO/IEC 30107-4 Biometric Presentation Attack Detection – 
Part 4: Profile for evaluation of mobile devices. 
6.5.1 Journal papers 
[95] I. Goicoechea-Telleria, R. Sanchez-Reillo, J. Liu-Jimenez, and R. Blanco-
Gonzalo, “Attack Potential Evaluation in Desktop and Smartphone Fingerprint 
Sensors: Can They Be Attacked by Anyone?,” Hindawi, vol. 2018, pp. 1–13, 2018. 
• Along with study 1 of Chapter 5, an attack potential analysis was carried out 
for PAD evaluations. 
6.5.2 Conference papers 
[22] I. Goicoechea-Telleria, J. Liu-Jimenez, R. Sanchez-Reillo, and W. Ponce-
Hernandez, “Vulnerabilities of Biometric Systems integrated in Mobile Devices : an 
evaluation,” IEEE Int. Carnahan Conf. Secur. Technol., 2016.  
• Contribution of developing a methodology for PAD evaluation on mobile 
devices and then performing an evaluation following it.  
[97] I. Goicoechea-Telleria, A. Garcia-peral, A. Husseis, and R. Sanchez-reillo, 
“Presentation Attack Detection Evaluation on Mobile Devices : Simplest Approach for 
Capturing and Lifting a Latent Fingerprint,” in International Carnahan Conference on 
Security Technology (ICCST), 2018. 
• Contribution of performing a PAD evaluation on mobile devices using non-
cooperative attacks and finding and using a novel approach to steal latent 
fingerprints from a capture subject. 
6.5.3 Standardization 
[2]  SC 37, “ISO/IEC 2nd WD 30107-4 Biometric presentation attack detection - 
Part 4: Profile for evaluation of mobile devices,” 2018. 
• Contributions on feedback, enrollment and verification policies and 
description requirements.  
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Chapter 7. Presentation Attack 
Detection evaluation on mobile devices 
- multiple non-experts 
______________________ 
 
THE PREVIOUS CHAPTER covered two PAD evaluations performed on mobile devices 
by two different experts. This gave rise to two questions: do all attackers get the same 
results when attacking a biometric system? Does expertise count? (Figure 35). With 
this in mind, it was decided to give the same smartphones to several different attackers 
with no previous knowledge on Biometrics and let them attempt to attack them. The 
goal was also to find additional materials that could be successful in fooling fingerprint 
sensors.  
 
Figure 35. Reasoning for evaluations on mobile devices performed by multiple non-
expert attackers. 
For study 4, 36 attackers with no background in Biometrics were given one week to 
attack one smartphone’s fingerprint reader (6 smartphones in total, same ones than in 
the second study). Each had to, at least, use 3 bona fide capture and use each material 
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at least 120 times on the smartphone sensor, making a total of 10,034 attempts. As 
more than one week would be needed to create non-cooperative fake fingers, the study 
was focused only on cooperative attacks. 
For study 5, a similar task was given to an additional 10 non-experts in spoofing, 
but in a hackathon setting. This entails that the participants did not perform a thorough 
evaluation with a set protocol, but instead tried many different materials for artefacts. 
Thus, the goal of this study is to find out which material combinations were able to 
hack the device at least once, and to see if smartphones can be hacked by novel 
attackers in a short time. Working in groups of three or four, each team was given the 
task to experiment with the creation of a series of fake fingers in an attempt to unlock 
smartphones. They could ask for any material from the supermarket or Amazon to 
complete this task, so that the attack potential stays low. Before the hackathon, they 
had one week to research methods and materials. For development and testing, they 
had a 12-hour limit.  
For both studies, the starting point for the participants was a video of an expert (the 
one from study 1) creating molds and artefacts, along with papers on the subject. An 
overview of both studies can be seen on Figure 36. Due to the nature of the hackathon 
(time limit), some evaluation protocol characteristics from study 5 are not available. 
Moreover, at the beginning of the hackathon (study 5), one of the smartphones broke 
and its evaluation could not be performed. 
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Figure 36. Overview of evaluations on mobile devices performed by multiple non-expert 
attackers. 
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7.1 Planning 
For the case of the third study, we gathered 36 inexperienced attackers with no 
background in attacking biometric systems. We prepared a process or “recipe” they had 
to follow to create the artefacts and we gave it to them on writing and video. They had 
to create artefacts with Play-Doh and gelatin but could get extra points for using more 
PAI species. Again, there were 6 smartphones available for the evaluation and each 
simulated attacker was given one at random. Also, those who owned one of these cell 
phones could use them for the attack. Thus, some smartphones were used more than 
others. They had one week to perform at least 120 attack attempts per PAI species. To 
make sure that they were performing the evaluation correctly, attackers had to record 
themselves on video using the fake fingers on the sensors. Moreover, they had to take 
pictures of all molds and artefacts, and finally had to hand over a box with all of them. 
A similar experiment was performed for study 5 in the shape of a hackathon: 
participants had 1 week to research attack methods and 12 hours to perform the 
attacks, including PAI preparation. 
PAD evaluations on mobile devices were performed on 6 smartphones with 
different embedded fingerprint readers. Their main characteristics (sensor type, shape 
and location) can be seen on Table 37. The description of the target application is 
detailed on Table 38. 
Table 37. Identification of all possible threats and attacks: description of TOE. 
Sensor details 
 
Mobile device (MD) Sensor type Sensor shape Sensor location 
MD1 Swipe Rectangular Front 
MD2 Touch Circular Front 
MD3 Touch Rectangular Front 
MD4 Touch Rectangular Side 
MD5 Touch Circular Back 
MD6 Touch Rectangular Front 
Evaluator’s access Black box (pass/fail result) Full system 
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Table 38. Identification of all possible threats and attacks: description of target 
application. 
Applications Unlock user’s smartphone. Access apps, e.g. bank accounts, password managers, personal pictures, etc. 
Consequences of 
successful attack 
• Unauthorized person unlocking another person’s smartphone. 
• No oversight while being used. 
Implemented 
functions 
Enrollment:  
• Real fingers 
• Different enrollment policies: 
Mobile 
device Attempt policy for enrollment 
MD1 
Around 10 attempts needed (can be extended 10 more times 
if wanted). Asks the user to move finger to get different 
samples and checks it. 
MD2 
Around 15 attempts needed (10 for center part of the finger 
and 5 for corners). Asks the user to move finger to get 
different samples and checks it.  
MD3 Around 20 attempts needed. Asks the user to move finger to get different samples and checks it. 
MD4 Around 20 attempts needed. Asks the user to move finger to get different samples and checks it. 
MD5 Around 6 attempts needed. It just asks the user to move the finger to get different samples but does not check it. 
Verification:  
• Artefact attempts to be verified as the real finger that has been 
previously enrolled 
• Different verification policies: 
Mobile 
device 
Allowed failed 
attempts Policy 
MD1 5 Waits for 30 seconds, can do attack again 
MD2 3 Asks for PIN (blocked sensor needs PIN to unlock) 
MD3 5 Waits for 30 seconds, can do attack again 
MD4 5 Waits for 30 seconds, can do attack again 
 
For the evaluation, the same smartphone app is used to log the attempts carried out 
by the attackers. For more details, refer to Chapter 6. The procedure for creating 
cooperative molds and artefacts is the same procedure used for cooperative attacks on 
desktop readers from Section 5.1.2.  
7.1.1 Analysis of attack potential 
As it was explained on Section 4.1.2 Analysis of Attack Potential, the attack 
potential is a measure of the effort to be expended in attacking a TOE with a PAI, 
expressed in terms of an attacker’s expertise, resources and motivation, which can be 
divided into more specific parameters. In this way, TOEs are given a rating to assess 
their resistance to specific attacks. As explained previously, every threat has a 
corresponding attack. The particular case for this study can be seen on Table 39. 
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Table 39. Planning: Analysis of attack potential by searching threats and their 
corresponding attacks (all studies on mobile devices). 
Possible 
threats 
• Only presentation attack: using an artefact generated from a user’s 
real finger on the sensor. 
• Intended operation of the system: unlock a smartphone, and thus 
accessing private data. 
Possible 
attacks 
• Corresponding attack: presentation attack.  
• Biometric characteristic can be obtained with or without 
cooperation from the capture subject. In this case, attacks were 
cooperative.  
• Level of expertise of the evaluator: proficient, although the materials 
needed for the evaluation can be found at any supermarket. 
 
7.1.1.1 Attack Potential calculation 
Following the methodology already detailed on Section 4.1.2, the attack potential 
must be calculated to determine whether the TOE is resistant to attacks assuming a 
specific attack potential of an attacker. The calculation by score assignment for both 
studies can be seen on Table 40. All materials result in the same attack potential score, 
as all of them take less than 1 week to build, even for inexperienced attackers. 
Table 40. Attack Potential calculation for cooperative attacks on smartphone fingerprint 
sensors. 
COOPERATIVE ATTACKS 
 
Preparation phase 
PAI construction + 
exercising phase 
Attack 
execution 
phase 
Total 
factor 
rating 
Score 
Elapsed time 
<1 day (capture subject is 
cooperative) 
<1 day or <1 week 
(different material 
difficulty) 
Few seconds 
(perform attack) 
<1 week or 
<2 weeks 
1.5 
Expertise 
Layman (information on 
effective materials widely 
available on internet) 
Layman (easy to create) Layman (not 
much expertise 
needed) 
Layman 0 
Knowledge of TOE 
Public (well known on the 
internet that it works) 
Public (manuals can be 
found on the internet) 
Public (no 
knowledge 
needed) 
Public 0 
Window of opportunity 
Unnecessary (no access to 
TOE needed) 
Easy (access to TOE for 
practicing) 
Easy (no 
oversight) 
Easy 1 
Equipment 
Standard (materials easy to 
obtain at supermarkets or 
online) 
Standard (but it is 
necessary to buy the TOE, 
which can be expensive) 
Standard (no 
equipment 
needed) 
Standard 2 
Overall attack rating 4.5 (Basic) 
Attack resistance Minimum 
 
The overall attack rating is 4.5 (Basic) for the cooperative ones. Thus, the attacks 
would have to be considered in penetration testing for all evaluations assuming 
Minimum attack potentials (or higher). If penetration tests show that the attack is 
successful, the TOE would fail to resist against that attack potential. 
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7.1.2 Specification of penetration test 
Once the TOE has been analyzed and described, the penetration test can be 
planned. The specifics for all studies on mobile devices can be seen on Table 41. 
Table 41. Penetration test characteristics for the study on smartphone sensors 
performed by multiple non-expert attackers. 
 Study 4 Study 5 (hackathon) 
Capture 
subjects 115 
? 
(no information from participants) 
Sources per 
capture 
subject 
(fingers) 
6 (index, middle and thumb from both hands) 
Total 
sources 
(fingers) 
372 ? (no information from participants) 
Attempts 
per finger 10 
? 
(no information from participants) 
Total 
attempts 10,034 359 
Sessions 1 for bona fide 1 for attacks 
Cooperation Cooperative 
PAI species 
12 (Play-Doh, gelatin, gelatin 
with glycerin, silicone, TAC 
adhesive, wax, clay, wood 
glue, conductive ink, latex, 
homemade clay, agar) 
13 (Play-Doh, gelatin, white glue, white 
glue + graphite, gelatin + glyceryn, wax, 
alginate, body wax + conductive ink, 
gelatin + graphite, plasticine + conductive 
ink, plasticine, gelatin + conductive ink, 
BluTack) 
Molds Silicone BluTack, wax, hot glue, plasticine, Play-Doh, silicone, stamp wax 
Evaluator’s 
access Black box (pass/fail result) 
Evaluator 
number and 
expertise 
36 non-experts 10 non-experts 
7..1.2.1.1.1 Execution 
As it was explained on Section 4.2, the execution can be done once the penetration 
test has been specified. It comprises three phases: detection, capture and processing. 
7.1.2.2 Detection 
Before the actual execution, the different PAI species were put to the test. If the 
sensor could detect the fingerprint, then it could be selected for the evaluation. 
7.1.2.3 Capture 
As it was mentioned on the previous chapter, checking the quality is not always 
possible for the evaluator. Also, each mobile device will have different algorithms, 
sensor technologies and quality and decision thresholds. 
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7.1.2.4 Processing 
In the case of smartphones, being full systems with no access to intermediate data, 
no quality or similarity scores can be obtained, only pass/fail results. Thus, the data 
used for the posterior analysis was based solely on this. 
7.2 Results 
After the penetration test is executed, the results from both experiments can be 
obtained and analyzed. As it was explained on Section 4.3, the metrics to be used to 
report a full system (Figure 37) are IAPMR (Impostor Attack Presentation Match Rate) 
and its complementary, IAPNMR (Impostor Attack Presentation Non-Match Rate). 
This applies to all full-system evaluations performed on smartphones.  
 
Figure 37. IAPMR and IAPNMR metrics, according to ISO/IEC 30107-3. 
As having successful PAIs is an undesirable outcome, the number of successful 
attacks will be represented in red, while unsuccessful attacks will be shown in green in 
all graphs. 
7.2.1 Penetration test results 
As it is important to obtain all the different nuances of the gathered results, several 
cases are analyzed for the penetration test:  
• Results per device 
• Results per device, per study 
• Results per device, per attacker 
• Results per device, per PAI species 
For every case, two separate graphs will be shown: IAPMR graph and fail/pass 
graph. IAPMR shows the proportion of successful attacks, but it is also important to 
discern how many attacks were performed in each case, as some experiments have far 
more attempts than others. 
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7.2.1.1 Results per device 
This subsection gathers the overall presentation attack results for all mobile devices 
tested, both studies and all PAI species. For clarification purposes, these results will be 
shown inside the corresponding mobile device. The IAPMR for each device is 
represented on Figure 29 and the number of successful and unsuccessful attacks on 
Figure 30. 
 
Figure 38. IAPMR per device, both experiments together. 
 
Figure 39. Number of successful (in red) and failed (in green) attacks for each mobile 
device. Both experiments together. 
As it can be observed, the most vulnerable mobile device overall is MD5 with a 
19.3% of successful presentation attacks and the least vulnerable is MD6 with 0.7%, 
followed closely by MD1 with 1.8%. MD4 was the device with the highest number of 
attack attempts: 293 successful and 2,354 unsuccessful. As it can be seen, there is a big 
difference in the number of attack attempts, as MD1 only had 222 total tries. This is 
because the attackers had a high difficulty placing the PAI on the sensor without 
breaking it (swipe sensor). 
7.2.1.2 Results per device, per study 
This subsection analyzes the difference between studies. Even though both 
experiments were performed by multiple non-experienced attackers, the goal of study 
4 was to follow a set evaluation protocol and experiment for one week, while the goal 
of study 5 was to find PAI species that worked on the sensors within a 12-hour limit. 
Thus, the results of each study are separated in Figure 40 and Figure 41.  
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Figure 40. IAPMR per device (MD1-MD6) and per study (4-5). 
 
Figure 41. Number of successful (in red) and failed (in green) attacks for each mobile 
device, divided by study. 
Notably, the experiments performed on MD4 on study 5 are the most successful 
(75% IAPMR), in high contrast with the other test. Nevertheless, on the fail/pass 
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complementary graph (Figure 41), it can be seen that very few experiments were done 
on study 5 in general (359 total attacks) due to the nature of this test, as it was a 
hackathon with a very tight time limit. This proves that, even if the number of total 
attempts is important, it is possible to attack a fingerprint sensor in a short time. 
7.2.1.3 Results per device, per attacker 
The aim of both experiments was to analyze whether different attackers with the 
same background and starting point would get similar results. The IAPMR for each 
mobile device, study and attacker can be seen on Figure 42. 
Clearly, it can be confirmed that the results vary highly among attackers, from 0% 
to 75% successful attacks. 18 out of 46 attackers could not successfully attack the 
smartphone even once, while Attacker 24 (study 5, 12-hour limit) obtained an IAPMR 
of 75%, 70% and 15% on MD4, MD3 and MD1 respectively. Attacker 2 (study 4) could 
hack MD3 66.7% of the times and Attacker 34 (study 5) could do so with MD5 55.6% 
of the times. Moreover, all attackers had a hard time attacking MD6, as most of them 
failed except for Attacker 16 (study 4), who obtained a small IAPMR of 1.5%. 
It must be noted that, for study 4, attacks were performed in an ordered way 
following an evaluation protocol, while for study 5 participants were trying different 
materials on a tight time limit. This means that a very small number of attacks were 
attempted on the hackathon. Thus, it is important to visualize the number of total 
attempts performed by each attacker (Figure 43). It can be observed that, while 
Attacker 3 (study 4) obtained the highest IAPMR, he or she carried out very few 
attempts: 90. Meanwhile, Attacker 10 (study 4) performed a total of 796 attempts. 
The most notable outcome of this subsection is that different attackers get very 
different results, even having the same starting point. At times, a person (experienced 
or non-experienced) gets the specific trick for attacking a sensor and from then on, 
most attacks can work. This can be due to practice or sheer luck. 
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Figure 42. IAPMR results per mobile device, study and attacker. 
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Figure 43. Number of successful (in red) and failed (in green) attacks for each mobile 
device, divided by study and by attacker. 
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7.2.1.4 Results per device, per PAI species 
On each experiment, different materials were used for building the PAIs. On both 
tests, participants were encouraged to find materials that were successful in attacking 
smartphone fingerprint sensors. An overview of the results of all PAI species can be 
seen on Figure 44 and Figure 45. 
 
Figure 44. IAPMR for each PAI species, divided by mobile device (MD1-MD6). The three 
most successful PAI species are marked in a different color. 
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It can be observed that alginate was the most successful PAI species reaching an 
IAPMR of 100%, followed by white glue with graphite (95%) and body wax with 
conductive paint on the surface (75%) on third place. The most consistent material 
within these experiments is Play-Doh, with an IAPMR of 1.6%, 13.4%, 12.2%, 0.1%, 
26.4% and 0.7% on devices MD1-MD6, respectively. Nevertheless, alginate and body 
wax with conductive paint have not been tried on all smartphones. MD3 is the 
smartphone on which the biggest number of materials has been tried.  
Although some materials proved to be very successful on some smartphones, it 
must be noted again that, very few attempts were performed in comparison with study 
4. A graph with the number of passes and fails for each material can be seen on Figure 
45. It can be observed that alginate, the PAI species with an IAPMR of 100% for MD4, 
had very few total attempts (10, all of them performed by the same attacker and with 
the same finger source).  
It must be noted that, for study 4, 46 attackers had 1 week to attack a smartphone 
while, for study 5, 10 attackers had 12 hours to do so. That is, the subjects for study 4 
had 156 more hours for performing the attacks. Interestingly, the average IAPMR is 
13.2% and 25.1% for studies 4 and 5, respectively. Thus, in average, those that had a 
shorter time to carry on the attacks obtained better results. This reinforces the idea 
that different attackers get very different outcomes and that it is very important to 
include as many attackers as possible in PAD evaluations. 
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Figure 45. Number of successful (in red) and failed (in green) attacks, divided by device 
and PAI species. 
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and latex, very common materials, do not work due to the nature of the technology. As 
it is a swipe sensor, PAIs broke when trying to use them on the smartphone reader. 
7.2.2 Vulnerability test results 
As it was explained on Section 4.3.1, once all the data has been analyzed after the 
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Table 42. List of vulnerabilities of smartphones. It must be noted that not all PAI species 
were tried on every phone and that different numbers of attempts were performed on 
each experiment. 
PAI species MD1 MD2 MD3 MD4 MD5 MD6 
Play-Doh x x x x x x 
Gelatin  x x x x x 
Latex  x     
Silicone     x  
White glue  x x x x  
Latex + graphite       
White glue + graphite       
Gelatin + graphite   x  x  
Alginate   x x   
Body wax + conductive ink    x   
Gelatin + graphite       
Play-Doh + conductive ink     x  
Homemade clay   x    
Agar    x   
 
It must be noted that some PAI species were used more times than others. More 
importantly, not all PAI species were tried on all smartphones by the non-experienced 
attackers, and most attackers oversaw only one smartphone and not multiple, due to 
the time constraints.  
The consequences that may derive from these vulnerabilities are that an attacker 
could unlock the phone and have access to all the apps that do not require additional 
security, which are most of them at the time this paper was written. 
7.3 Comparison with expert attackers 
What Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 have in common is that they entail full-system PAD 
evaluations performed on mobile devices. Chapter 6 gathered two evaluations with an 
established protocol, carried out by two experts cooperatively and non-cooperatively. 
On the other hand, Chapter 7 focused on observing the ability of inexperienced 
attackers to perform cooperative attacks on mobile devices, having a time limit. 
Although the particular outcomes of each study were detailed in their corresponding 
chapters, it is also interesting to draw a connection between both, as all of them are 
about attacking fingerprint sensors embedded in mobile devices. The results that will 
be compared are per device and study and per attacker. 
7.3.1 Comparison: results per study 
It is interesting to compare the IAPMR results for each study, and mostly for experts 
and non-experts. It must be reminded that studies 2, 4 and 5 had only cooperative 
attacks, while study 3 had only non-cooperative ones (Figure 46). 
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Figure 46. Characteristics of studies. 
On Figure 47, the total IAPMR for each device and for each study can be observed. 
It is not clear whether the total of novice attackers perform better or worse than the 
expert ones: for MD2 and MD3, the results among all studies are very similar; on MD1, 
experts performed better; on MD4, non-experts obtained considerably better results. 
 
 
 
Figure 47. IAPMR results divided by mobile device and study. The colors correspond to 
expert/non-expert attackers. 
Nevertheless, once more, it must be noted that as study 5 (hackathon) did not follow 
an established protocol, very few artefacts were used on the smartphone sensors. Thus, 
the passes and fails graph must be observed too (Figure 48). In all smartphones except 
MD6, the expert from study 3 attempted the most attacks, up to 3,600 for some 
smartphones. Thus, the comparison to be made for the case of study 5 has limitations.  
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The most outstanding result is the one obtained for MD4 on study 5, achieving very 
contrasting IAPMRs: 1.7% and 2.9% for expert attackers and 9.8% and 75% for inexpert 
ones. As it will be explained on the coming plots, the 75% IAPMR case is due to having 
used one specific material that proved to be very successful when attacking fingerprint 
sensors. 
On the other hand, MD1 was tricky to use by inexperienced attackers and the 
number of successful attacks is lower than for the experienced ones. This could be due 
to the sensor type: being a swipe sensor, it is difficult to avoid the PAI from breaking 
at the time of use. 
 
 
Figure 48. Pass and fail results divided by mobile device and study. 
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inexperienced attackers could try a wide range of materials while the experts were 
limited to the very basic ones of the literature. In the cases where a high IAPMR is 
obtained, it is usually linked to having used a very successful material for fake finger 
creation, such as alginate or white glue (as it was seen on the previous section of this 
chapter). The results by number of passes and fails for each attacker can be found on 
Figure 50 where again, by far, the expert attacker 2 carried out the highest number of 
attacks, while the inexperienced attackers made very few attempts in general.  
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Figure 49. IAPMR for each attacker, divided by study and device. 
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Figure 50. Passes and fails for each attacker, divided by study and mobile device. 
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7.4 Conclusions 
In this chapter, 2 experiments were performed on smartphones that have an 
embedded fingerprint sensor. The aim of both studies was to observe if different 
attackers obtained different results having the same starting point: a video by an expert 
creating molds and artefacts and article references. The difference among both tests is 
that, while for the first one an evaluation protocol was followed and they had one week 
to perform attacks, for the second one the non-experienced attackers had a tight time 
limit of 12 hours. Thus, study 5 was only appropriate for finding out which materials 
proved to successfully attack a smartphone at least once. Throughout the process, some 
lessons were learnt: 
• IAPMR (Impostor Attack Presentation Match Rate) is highly dependent on the 
evaluator’s ability to create artefacts and on the capture subject. Thus, it is 
important to use as many attackers and capture subjects as possible when 
evaluating PAD in mobile devices. 
• In total, 28 out of 48 attackers (people with no expertise in attacking fingerprint 
sensors) could successfully attack them within a week and even within 12 hours, 
just by watching a video of a researcher doing it. Very similar videos are 
available on YouTube for everyone to see. Nonetheless, these studies have the 
limitation that each material was not tested on multiple fingers or across 
multiple users. 
• Experience when performing attacks counts sometimes, but anyone can get the 
trick to a specific reader, either in the first attempt of after months of trials. 
Every person has very different abilities when attacking a capture device, just as 
it would happen with cooking. 
• Given the large difference in results across different attackers, it is important to 
include as many attackers as possible in PAD evaluations, the same way it is 
done with the number of capture subjects. This issue was brought to the 
standard ISO/IEC 30107-4 and was included in the document. 
Nevertheless, it must be noted that even if an attacker can gain access to the 
smartphone, he or she will not be able to change passwords or add his or her own 
fingerprint to the system, as a PIN or password is needed for those actions. Moreover, 
if the attacker finds the smartphone when it’s shut down, he or she will also need a PIN 
or password to unlock it the first time. As a general consideration, it must be noted that 
including a fingerprint sensor in smartphones greatly increased the security of mobile 
devices. The reason is that people that had never set up a PIN or password on their 
phones (due to being uncomfortable or a nuisance) started using the fingerprint reader 
easily, adding an important layer of protection to their personal phones. 
7.5 Contributions and dissemination 
With these 2 experiments, one journal paper and two conference papers were 
published. Moreover, several contributions were accepted in the pertinent 
international standard ISO/IEC 30107-4 Biometric Presentation Attack Detection – 
Part 4: Profile for evaluation of mobile devices. 
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7.5.1 Journal papers 
[95] I. Goicoechea-Telleria, R. Sanchez-Reillo, J. Liu-Jimenez, and R. Blanco-
Gonzalo, “Attack Potential Evaluation in Desktop and Smartphone Fingerprint 
Sensors: Can They Be Attacked by Anyone?,” Hindawi, vol. 2018, pp. 1–13, 2018. 
• Study on non-expert attackers and comparison with other evaluations on 
fingerprint readers. 
7.5.2 Conference papers 
[98] I. Goicoechea-Telleria, J. Liu-Jimenez, H. Quiros-Sandoval, and R. Sanchez-
Reillo, “Analysis of the attack potential in low cost spoofing of fingerprints,” Proc. - Int. 
Carnahan Conf. Secur. Technol., vol. 2017–Octob, pp. 1–6, 2017. 
• Study of non-expert attackers and comparison with one expert. 
[99] R. B. Gonzalo, B. Corsetti, A. Husseis, and I. Goicoechea-Telleria, “Attacking a 
smartphone biometric fingerprint system : a novice’s approach,” 2018 Int. Carnahan 
Conf. Secur. Technol., vol. 675087, no. October, pp. 1–5, 2018. 
• Report of the hackathon experiment. 
7.5.3 Standardization 
[2]  SC 37, “ISO/IEC 2nd WD 30107-4 Biometric presentation attack detection - 
Part 4: Profile for evaluation of mobile devices,” 2018. 
• Added that having multiple attackers perform the same test is as important 
as having multiple capture subjects, using these studies as proof. 
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Chapter 8. Detection of Presentation 
Attacks 
______________________ 
 
AS IT WAS detailed on Section 3.3 Presentation attack detection mechanisms, 
extensive research has been carried out in the literature in order to detect fingerprint 
attacks at the presentation level. Once several desktop and mobile device fingerprint 
sensor vulnerabilities were evaluated, it was decided to create a new method to 
overcome presentation attacks. The chosen approach focuses on optical readers, 
generally used at border controls and increased security scenarios. As it was noted on 
the same chapter, hardware solutions usually reach better error rates than the software 
ones, because more information of the fingerprint can be obtained if the PAD 
mechanism is part of the capture process design than analyzing the images posteriori. 
Two approaches were tested based on the distinctiveness of skin features under 
different wavelength illumination. First, a narrow-band camera with 10nm wavelength 
increments was used to analyze a small database of real and fake fingerprints and 
observe the differences in characteristics. Second, portable microscopes with special 
lighting conditions were used to do the same experiment but gathering a bigger 
database. These solutions are compatible with optical sensors. However, because of 
their bulkiness, they are not compatible with other readers, such as capacitive ones. 
The image processing and classification algorithms were very similar for both studies. 
More details will be given on the following subsections.  
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8.1 Narrow-band camera 
The goal of this study is to use a narrow-band camera’s advantages to observe a 
fingerprint in 10nm wavelength increments and to classify bona fide and attack 
attempts using Bag of Features. All results are given in accordance to the standard on 
Presentation Attack Detection ISO/IEC 30107-3. 
8.1.1 Methodology and image capture 
All real fingerprints and artefacts were captured with a multiband camera. The 
setup (Figure 51) was the same used for the experiment on [100], where they explored 
the number of hand features obtainable in different wavelengths. The outcome of that 
study was that, at certain bands, a bigger number of characteristics could be obtained 
when capturing a human hand and chicken livers. Thus, the idea for this study was to 
use the same approach with real and fake fingers, in order to observe which bands gave 
more distinctiveness for image classification algorithms. The setup is a VariSpecTM 
liquid crystal tunable filter (CRi) as a controllable narrow-band filter in increments of 
10nm over a range of 400–720nm. To overcome the low light intensity during filtering, 
an optiMOS camera (QImaging) was used with a high-sensitivity image sensor with a 
resolution of 1920 × 1080 pixels. The maximum frame rate is of 100 fps. The light 
source was an LP-500U white LED manufactured by FalconEyes. 
 
 
  
Figure 51. Setup of the narrow-band camera and bona fide subject holding finger ready 
for capture. 
As shown on Figure 51, the subject holds his or her finger on the wall and the 
narrow-band camera captures 36 wavelengths in one take, from 400 to 720nm plus R, 
G and B. 
The setup of the camera belonged to a hospital laboratory, and thus we only had a 
very narrow window of access to the system. Hence, only one visit was done per capture 
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subject and only 3 subjects could access the laboratory. In total, 9,646 images were 
obtained. The details of the captured database can be found on Table 43. The selection 
of PAI species was Play-Doh (most common material used in studies due to its ease of 
use and obtention), latex (transparency and resemblance to a real finger) and 
transparent nail polish (similar to latex, but possible to get a very thin layer that can be 
easily hidden from oversight). Fingers were captured in two different conditions each: 
normal and with hand cream. This is because some real fingers with moisturizer on the 
surface could confuse a PAD mechanism with a fake finger. 
Table 43. Details of the database following requirements of ISO/IEC 30107-3. 
 
8.1.2 Wavelength observations 
After the capture, some appreciations were made on the different observable 
characteristics of fingerprints and artefacts: 
• 400-450nm: Noisy images, no fingerprints can be seen. 
• 460nm: first noticeable fingerprint. 
• 530-580nm: patches on the fingerprint. 
• 580-590nm: Play-Doh artefacts are very dark. 
• 600nm: fingerprints and artefacts change from dark to bright. 
• 610nm: noticeable veins. Play-Doh is very bright. 
• 630nm: wrinkles are not noticeable anymore. 
• 670nm: very bright fingerprints. 
• 690nm: sweat is more perceivable. 
Presentation attack instruments 18 
PAI species 3 (Play-Doh, latex, transparent nail polish) 
PAI series 1 per source 
Visits 1 
Test subjects 3 
Artefacts per test subject 6 (thumb, index and middle fingers) 
Sources 18 
PAI species 3 (Play-Doh, latex, transparent nail polish) 
Bona fide finger conditions 2 (normal, hand cream) 
Output information from PAD mechanism PAD score 
Attempts per presentation 3 
Attack attempts 
162 (per wavelength) 
5,832 (total) 
Bona fide attempts 
98 (per wavelength) 
3,814 (total) 
Images collected 
260 (per wavelength) 
9,646 (total) 
Wavelengths 36 (33 narrow-band and R, G and B) 
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A few examples of captured images can be seen on Figure 52. It is apparent that 
Play-Doh has very distinct characteristics when observed at different wavelengths. This 
will make this PAI species easily classifiable. 
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Figure 52. Examples of real and artefact samples at 550nm and 630nm. 
8.1.3 Processing and classification 
Two different approaches were used for the processing of the images: 
• Wavelength study and selection: no preprocessing was needed for this 
approach. Further details will be explained on Section 8.1.4. 
• Image alignment and subtraction: based on the experiment where the same 
camera was used to obtain features [100], the three most relevant wavelengths 
were chosen for the processing (530nm, 610nm and 720nm). As images from 
different wavelengths are taken at slightly different times, first an alignment was 
done, and then the three images were combined into one by subtraction and 
addition (the 610nm image was subtracted from the 720nm image, and then the 
530nm sample was added).  
Once the images were processed and prepared, the classification was performed. In 
both cases, the approach used for classification is Bag of Features or Bag of Visual 
Words. This model, initially used for document classification known as Bag of Words, 
can also be suitable for fingerprint image classification. This is because it does a good 
job distinguishing textures by creating frequency distributions of image patches, as it 
is a vector of occurrence count of a vocabulary of local image features (Figure 53). Thus, 
it was thought to be adequate for this case, as differences in textures could indicate if a 
finger is real or fake. 
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The model uses SIFT feature descriptors, appropriate for this case because they 
handle well intensity, rotation and scale differences. Then, these vector-represented 
patches are sorted into “codewords”, which in turn convert into a “codebook”. For this, 
k-means clustering is performed automatically and the codewords are defined as the 
centers of these clusters. This way, each image patch is mapped to a specific codeword 
and any image fed to the algorithm can be represented by a frequency histogram of 
codewords [101]–[103]. Once clusters and distance matrices are computed, the 
classification is performed using support vector machines (SVM). 
 
Figure 53. Bag of Features or Bag of Visual Words diagram. 
8.1.4 Results 
The results will be given according to ISO/IEC 30107-3 requirements. In this case, 
it is a PAD subsystem, so the relevant metrics are APCER (proportion of attack 
presentations using the same PAI species incorrectly classified as bona fide 
presentations in a specific scenario) and BPCER (proportion of bona fide presentations 
incorrectly classified as presentation attacks in a specific scenario). These were 
addressed in Section 2.3.2. 
8.1.4.1 Selected wavelengths study 
The goal of this study is to use the narrow-band camera’s advantages to see a 
fingerprint in increments of 10nm and discern which wavelengths are more useful for 
classification. Thus, in this case, all wavelengths were used separately to train the 
algorithm. As a result, APCER and BPCER values for each wavelength are shown on 
Table 44 and a plot is shown on Figure 54 for clarification. 
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Table 44. APCER and BPCER values for each wavelength (increments of 10nm and 
RGB). 70% training, 30% testing. 
Wavelength 
(nm) 
APCER 
(%) 
BPCER 
(%) 
Wavelength 
(nm) 
APCER 
(%) 
BPCER 
(%) 
400 9.3 40.1 580 6.0 21.3 
410 7.3 53.3 590 7.1 15.7 
420 14.2 37.1 600 6.0 21.9 
430 7.8 41.9 610 7.3 22.4 
440 8.9 47.5 620 6.7 26.8 
450 8.4 27.7 630 7.1 15.5 
460 4.4 27.2 640 7.1 21.0 
470 1.8 18.3 650 4.4 15.1 
480 1.3 26.7 660 7.6 9.3 
490 4.0 18.1 670 7.6 13.6 
500 3.1 13.2 680 3.6 22.8 
510 4.9 12.7 690 3.8 18.2 
520 3.6 20.6 700 5.1 22.2 
530 5.3 22.8 710 6.4 18.9 
540 6.2 20.5 720 9.1 13.4 
550 4.9 10.5 R 5.3 23.9 
560 6.2 12.5 B 4.2 21.3 
570 2.4 24.5 G 0.7 27.6 
 
 
Figure 54. APCER and BPCER for each wavelength. The three lowest results for APCER 
and BPCER are marked in yellow. 
As it can be seen, the 10 wavelengths that showed to reach a better average APCER 
and BPCER at classification are 470, 490, 500, 510, 550, 560, 650, 660, 670 and 
690nm. Thus, it was decided to use all these wavelengths for another analysis by using 
all of them together for training. In total, 980 bona fide and 1,620 attack images were 
used. As for every other case, each result was calculated 20 times and then averaged, 
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and all samples were randomized before each iteration. A cross validation of the results 
obtained using this technique can be seen on Table 45. 
Table 45. Cross validation of APCER and BPCER results for the selected wavelengths 
study. All values were calculated 20 times and then averaged. 
 Training percentage 
10% 30% 50% 70% 90% 
APCER 4.99 7.01 5.76 3.89 4.83 
BPCER 55.32 27.21 21.97 17.55 10.47 
8.1.4.2 Image alignment and subtraction study 
As said on 8.1.3, images from three different wavelengths (530nm, 610nm and 
720nm) are aligned and combined by addition and subtraction, and then are classified 
by using Bag of Features. The APCER and BPCER results are shown on Table 46 
depending on the training percentage used for classification, from 10% to 90%. As it 
can be seen, the classification results are better for attack classification than for bona 
fide classification. 
Table 46. Cross validation of APCER and BPCER results for the image alignment and 
subtraction study. All values were calculated 20 times and then averaged 
 Training percentage 10% 30% 50% 70% 90% 
APCER 4.62 4.66 1.98 3.67 7.5 
BPCER 45.05 26.86 18.17 9.94 8.86 
 
The results to be compared are total APCER and BPCER of both studies, as other 
intermediary APCER and BPCER results have too few samples (that is, results by PAI 
species and results by capture subject). Taking the 50% training result from the cross 
validations, the image combination approach gets an APCER of 1.98% and a BPCER of 
18.17%, while the selected wavelengths approach obtains a 5.76% APCER and 21.97% 
BPCER. Although results for bona fide samples are poor, the error rate for 
misclassifying attacks is low compared to other approaches of the literature. 
8.1.5 Conclusions 
A study was performed with a multiband narrow-band camera to observe 
fingerprints in increments of 10nm and choose the best wavelengths for classification. 
Two approaches were used prior to classification: 3 wavelength combination by 
addition and subtraction, and best wavelength selection. The classification was done 
using Bag of Features. Some lessons were learned from this work: 
• It is important to study fingerprints in narrowly separated wavelengths, as 
different features and characteristics can be obtained for each. Also, some 
wavelengths give significantly better results than others. 
• In this case, combining several wavelengths in a single image worked better 
than training the algorithm with mixed wavelengths. 
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• Bag of Features gives good results for fingerprint attack classification, as it 
is designed for distinguishing textures regardless of position and 
orientation. 
8.2 Microscopes with special lighting 
Once the previous short experiment was performed, it was seen that observing 
fingerprints in different wavelengths can have promising outcomes, even more when 
combined with the Bag of Features classification algorithm. Nevertheless, the solution 
was too bulky, so it was decided to look for a more portable system that would follow 
the same approach of illuminating fingerprints in different lighting conditions. Also, 
another goal was for this solution to be cost-effective. 
For that end, 2 handheld microscopes with special lighting were found and a PAD 
evaluation was developed and performed. In total, 7,704 images of fake and real 
fingerprints of 17 subjects were captured. These images were processed and classified 
using Bag of Features algorithms (as in the previous experiment), obtaining an APCER 
of 1.78% and a BPCER of 1.33% at 70% training samples (3.99% and 1.11% for 50% 
training, respectively). It must be noted that these results were obtained even including 
a capture subject with non-conformant fingerprints (no ridges or valleys) in the 
database. Moreover, no fingerprint samples were left out, minus those that were the 
evaluator’s fault – wrong finger, wrong LED wavelength turned on. All results are given 
in accordance to the standard on Presentation Attack Detection ISO/IEC 30107-3. 
8.2.1 Methodology and image capture 
According to several works on fingerprint and skin imaging [100], [104]–[106], 
different features of the skin can be observed at different wavelengths, depending on 
the penetration of the light, and thus, on the wavelength used. For this reason, it was 
decided to use two special lighting microscopes: Dino-Lite AD4113T-I2V (UV and IR 
lights, 395nm and 940nm respectively) and Dino-Lite Edge AM4115T-GRFBY 
(fluorescent lighting, excitation at 480nm and 575nm and emission at 510nm and 
610nm). The cost of these microscopes was less than 500€ and less than 1000€ 
respectively at the time of writing, but after the study it will be concluded that a cheaper 
solution is possible, as only one excitation and one emission wavelength will be needed. 
As it is usually the case, the solutions used during research stages are more expensive 
than the final commercial solution. Once the study is made, a simpler, cheaper system 
can be developed by a manufacturer, as for the final product less microscope 
amplification and less wavelengths will be needed for obtaining the results. That is why 
it is viable to include this solution in commercial optical fingerprint devices. An 
overview of the skin penetration of each wavelength can be seen on Figure 55. 
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Figure 55. Different skin penetration levels depending on wavelength of digital 
microscopes. 
A PAD evaluation was carried out with the microscopes, in order to test how well 
this technique performs in detecting artefacts. As with the rest of experiments in this 
Thesis, Common Criteria [18] and ISO/IEC 30107-3 [1] standards were followed.  
As a reminder, the evaluator is not expected to determine the exploitability for 
potential vulnerabilities beyond those for which a Basic attack potential is required to 
effect an attack. That is, once a fake finger material with a Basic attack potential has 
proven to be successful, no attacks that would require a higher difficulty should be 
made, because the system is already confirmed to be vulnerable to easier attacks. 
Taking this in to account for the experiment, the easiest attacks were performed by 
using readily available and low-cost materials for building fake fingers. A test was 
designed following procedures from the Standard ISO/IEC 30107-3 [1] and its details 
can be seen on Table 47. As a note, in this case more PAIs and more capture subjects 
were used in comparison with the previous test with the narrow-band camera, as the 
first experiment was performed only as a proof of concept that needed to be expanded 
in the future. 
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Table 47. Details of the database following requirements of ISO/IEC 30107-3. 
Presentation attack 
instruments (PAI) 
438 (96 Play-Doh, 84 latex, 84 gelatin, 84 white glue, 
90 nail polish) 
PAI species 5 (Play-Doh, latex, transparent nail polish, gelatin, white glue) 
PAI series 1 per source 
Visits 2 per bona fide 1 per PAI species 
Capture subjects 17 (13 asian, 3 caucasian, 1 african) 
Artefacts per capture subject 6 
Sources 96 fingers 
Output PAD information PAD score 
Attempts per presentation 3 
Wavelengths 4 
Attack attempts 
1,314 (per wavelength) 
5,256 (total) 
Bona fide attempts 612 (per wavelength) 2,448 (total) 
Images collected 1,923 (per wavelength) 7,704 (total) 
Attacker’s expertise Expert (by the definition of CC’s attack potential [18]) 
 
A Matlab capture tool was developed to obtain images of fingerprints in an 
automated manner. It lets the evaluator enter bona fide and attacker IDs, number of 
attempts per finger, visit number, image resolution, whether they are real/artefact 
fingers, gender, PAI species, wavelengths and fingers. The app opens a window to 
visualize the microscope image output and captures the images in a sequence 
depending on the chosen parameters. As expected, different lighting conditions gave 
out different features when inspecting fingerprint images. Examples of images in 
different wavelengths are shown on Figure 56. 
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Figure 56. Examples of real and PAI images captured in different wavelengths. 
As it can be observed, the outputs can be easily distinguished in some cases. Play-
Doh, the most common material used for spoofing, has very different features in every 
wavelength, so it can be easily detected (smoother or no edges, different color). Latex, 
nail polish and gelatin artefacts have sharper edges (mostly in UV and IR wavelengths). 
White glue has very clear bubbles on the 575/610nm wavelength, no matter how 
carefully the artefact is created (they cannot be seen with a naked eye). 
8.2.1.1 Fingerprints with special characteristics 
Commonly, in evaluations found in the literature, fingerprints with special 
characteristics are discarded from the test. In this work, we chose to be inclusive and 
execute a realistic study, so a subject with fingerprints with special characteristics was 
included. This user presented non-conformant fingerprints due to a skin disease, 
meaning that they did not have any ridges or valleys, so they would be deemed unfit 
for recognition. On Section 8.2.3.5, we calculate results both including and excluding 
this subject with the goal of measuring the impact of non-conformant fingerprints in 
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realistic situations. As it can be seen on Figure 57, ridges and valleys are barely 
noticeable, if not at all. 
AD4113T-I2V AM4115T-GRFBY  
    
 
395nm 940nm 575/610nm 480/510nm  
Figure 57. Examples of non-conformant fingerprints of one user of the database with a 
skin disease, in different wavelengths. 
8.2.2 Processing and classification 
For this work, no preprocessing or cropping was necessary before feeding the 
images to the chosen model, Bag of Features. As it was seen on the previous 
experiment, this algorithm does a good job distinguishing textures, and thus it works 
well with fingerprint classification. More details were explained on 8.1.3. 
The results were calculated 10 times each and averaged and a cross-comparison was 
done with training at 10%, 30%, 50%, 70% and 90% of samples (randomized by capture 
subject, and never including the same subject both for training and testing). The 
vocabulary size of Bag of Features was 850, 80% of the strongest features were used 
and the grid step was of 16x16. In order to avoid adjusting parameters for only this 
specific database, these parameters were chosen with only the first few captured 
samples. Then, once the database capture was completed, the algorithm was applied 
without changing the parameters and they still performed well. In all cases, the 
subjects used for training were not used for testing. Two tests were made for 
classification: separate wavelengths and separate wavelength and channel. This way, it 
could be seen which wavelengths and channels behaved best for performance. 
8.2.3 Results 
This section gathers the results obtained in different tests, showing the 
classification error rates APCER and BPCER, as explained on 2.3.2. The tests 
performed are: classifying each wavelength separately, classifying each wavelength and 
RGB channel separately, using only the red channel of the 575/610nm wavelength and, 
lastly, leaving out the non-conformant samples of one capture subject (as it was 
explained in previous sections). 
8.2.3.1 By wavelength 
This subsection shows the results of classifying each wavelength separately. Each 
microscope has two different lighting modes: 
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• Dino-Lite AD4113T-I2V:  
1. UV (395nm) 
2. IR (940nm) 
• Dino-Lite AM4115T-GRFBY: fluorescent lights. 
1. Excitation at 480nm and emission at 510nm 
2. Excitation at 575nm and emission at 610nm 
Thus, each mode was studied separately. The samples were fed in RGB to the 
algorithm, and it converts them to grayscale before classification. The database 
includes non-conformant samples from a subject with a skin disease. Results for 
APCER and BPCER cross-comparisons can be seen on Figure 58 and Figure 59, 
respectively.  
 
Figure 58. APCER cross-comparison results for each lighting mode. Every result was 
calculated 10 times and then averaged. 
 
Figure 59. BPCER cross-comparison results for each lighting mode. Every result was 
calculated 10 times and then averaged. 
It can be observed that some wavelengths perform better than others. 395nm and 
480/510nm seem to work better for APCER results but, for the BPCER case, 
480/510nm and 940nm yield a lower error rate. 
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8.2.3.2 By wavelength and channel 
It was decided to break down the tests also by RGB channels, to check if some 
perform better than others. Results of this are detailed on Figure 60.  
 
Figure 60. APCER and BPCER results separated by wavelength and channel. 70% 
training, 30% testing. 
This study shows that the best performing conditions are using the red channel of 
the 575/610nm mode, one of the available lightings of the fluorescent microscope. 
With a naked eye, it can be observed that there are indeed perceivable differences 
(Figure 61). 
   
Real fingerprint Play-Doh PAI Gelatin PAI 
   
Nail Polish PAI White glue PAI Latex PAI 
Figure 61. Noticeable variation in R channel. 
Interestingly, using the 480/510nm in the blue channel, the BPCER is always 0% 
on this database. It was calculated 30 times. Thus, if wanted, only this channel could 
be used for eradicating the BPCER error of classifying real fingers as attacks. 
Nevertheless, this channel is the least suitable for APCER, as the error is very high 
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(76%). As the 575/610nm wavelength in the red channel seems to achieve lower error 
rates, a full cross-comparison was performed with it and it can be seen on Table 48. 
Table 48. APCER and BPCER cross-comparison of 575/610nm wavelength samples in 
the red channel. 
 Training percentage 
10% 30% 50% 70% 90% 
APCER 9.36 4.07 3.99 1.78 0.89 
BPCER 7.04 2.92 1.11 1.33 2.79 
 
According to ISO/IEC 30107-3, APCER and BPCER shall be calculated separately 
by PAI species. Thus, this subsection gathers the different results achieved per fake 
finger material, using the 575/610nm lighting mode and taking the red channel. The 
cross-comparisons for APCER and BPCER can be seen on Figure 62 and Figure 63. 
 
Figure 62. APCER cross-comparison with different PAI species. PLA = Play-Doh, GLT = 
gelatin, NPL = nail polish, WGL = white glue, LTX = latex. 
 
Figure 63. BPCER cross-comparison with different PAI species. PLA = Play-Doh, GLT = 
gelatin, NPL = nail polish, WGL = white glue, LTX = latex. 
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According to the graphs, the lowest APCER is clearly for the Play-Doh case (0%), 
followed by gelatin (1.64% at 70% training). For BPCER, latex gives the lowest error 
rate, 1.36% at 70% training, and Play-Doh, gelatin and white glue follow it with very 
similar rates: 2.41%, 2.35% and 2.34%, respectively. 
8.2.3.3 By PAI species, wavelength and RGB channel 
With the goal of having a more thorough study on wavelength and channel 
influence on the different materials, errors were calculated for each category 
classification. Channels R, G and B and wavelengths 575/610nm, 480/510nm, 940nm 
and 395nm were separated to calculate the different APCER and BPCER depending on 
the material put to the test. Results can be seen on Figure 64. For visualization 
purposes, the APCER + BPCER values greater than 20% are deleted on Figure 65. As 
it can be observed, some wavelengths and channels yield better error rates than others 
for different materials. For instance, the blue channel is the most problematic one 
when detecting fake fingers, with error rates as high as 96.54% for white glue in the 
475/510nm wavelength. On the other hand, some channels and wavelengths produce 
very promising error rates. The lowest ones for each material are shown on Table 49 
(70% of the samples were used for training). An interesting outcome is that, Play-Doh 
being the easiest to build PAI, it obtains also the lowest error rate.  
Table 49. Lowest error rates for each PAI species. Lower error rate considers the lowest 
APCER and BPCER combination. 
 PLA LTX NPL WGL GLT 
Difficulty to build PAI Easy Easy Easy Easy Medium 
APCER (%) 0.00 1.20 1.19 0.00 2.59 
BPCER (%) 2.03 2.67 1.12 2.67 2.67 
Wavelength 610 940 610 940 610 
Color channel R B R B R 
 
 
Figure 64. APCER and BPCER calculated by PAI species, wavelength and RGB channel. 
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Figure 65. APCER and BPCER calculated by PAI species, wavelength and RGB channel. 
APCER + BPCER outliers greater than 20% are deleted for clarification. 
8.2.3.4 Time performance vs. image size 
The duration of a PAD subsystem classification is important for time-bound 
situations. A system that is meant for access control requires that the process for 
verification is fast, for convenience purposes. For other cases, like critical 
infrastructures where a high security level is required, taking more time might be 
acceptable in exchange for lower error rates.  
To study this matter, images from the 575/610nm wavelength in the red channel 
were cropped to different sizes, from 50px to 600px, and then the algorithm was used 
again to check if the performance held at smaller sizes. Then, the time performance 
was calculated for each case, for classifying one image as real or fake. The PC used for 
the calculations is an Intel Core x64 i7-6700 CPU at 3.40GHz with 16GB RAM, using 
MATLAB. The results can be seen on Figure 66.  
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Figure 66. APCER and BPCER results for different image sizes, as well as time elapsed 
for classifying 1 image. 
The graph shows an overview of the different trade-offs between size, error rates 
and time performance. For instance, at the 313x250px size, the error rates are quite 
low (2.91% APCER and 2.17% BPCER) while the time to classify one sample as real or 
fake is also low, 59.8ms, which could be a balanced trade-off. Both APCER and BPCER 
are best performing at the initial size, 750x600px (duration being 141.7ms); 
nevertheless, the size of 438x350 leads also to a low error rate, with an increase of 
0.41% for APCER and 0,95% for BPCER (duration being 47.7ms).  
8.2.3.5 Leaving out non-conformant fingerprints 
As there is a user in the database with non-conformant fingerprints due to a skin 
disease, another classification was done leaving these samples out (90 fake and 36 
real). As it can be seen on Table 50, APCER and BPCER are still similar to the values 
obtained including the user, meaning that the system can work even with non-
conformant fingerprints, as it is represented on Table 51. 
Table 50. APCER and BPCER cross-comparison of 575/610nm wavelength samples in 
the red channel, leaving out one capture subject’s non-conformant fingerprints due to a 
skin disease. Results were averaged 10 times. 
 Training percentage 
10% 30% 50% 70% 90% 
APCER 9.05 6.90 3.51 1.70 2.46 
BPCER 3.25 2.02 1.49 1.17 1.25 
 
Table 51. Decrease of APCER and BPCER leaving out the capture subject with a skin 
disease. 
 Training percentage 
10% 30% 50% 70% 90% 
∆ APCER -0,31 2,83 -0,48 -0,08 1,57 
∆ BPCER -3,79 -0,90 0,38 -0,16 -1,54 
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8.2.4 Conclusions 
This chapter gathers a thorough evaluation on a presentation attack detection 
technique and proposes a novel method to acquire fingerprints, having carried out the 
capture (including selection of hardware and the design of capture tools) and 
processing, classification and results analysis. As an outcome, a low-cost and good 
performing PAD subsystem was obtained. This is meaningful because hardware 
solutions have barely been researched and there are scarce reports, and usually these 
methods yield a high cost. 
First, a proof of concept experiment was carried out by using a narrow-band camera 
with a 10nm tunable filter. This made it possible to observe and classify fingerprints in 
different wavelengths. Then, 2 handheld microscopes with special lighting were used 
to perform a more thorough PAD evaluation, acquiring more fingerprints from more 
capture subjects and with a wider range of PAI species. In doing so, it was seen that it 
is possible to achieve a low APCER and BPCER values using only one wavelength 
(575nm) with a filter (610nm) and taking only the red channel, which makes it 
inexpensive and accurate (APCER of 1.78% and BPCER of 1.33% at 70% training). 
Moreover, although it must be more thoroughly tested and with a bigger database, all 
iterations of classifying the 480/510nm wavelength of the blue channel have shown a 
BPCER of 0,00%. Furthermore, it was discovered that Play-Doh artefacts are very easy 
to detect with this approach, which is a very commonly used material. 
In addition, the database included one subject whose fingerprints did not have any 
noticeable ridges and valleys due to a skin disease, and it was seen that the attack 
detection error only improved very slightly when removing these samples. That means 
that this approach is also appropriate for these cases. 
8.2.5 Contributions and dissemination 
This work was part of the work done in collaboration with the Nara Institute of 
Science and Technology in Japan, in an 8-month mobility program. It resulted in a 
published journal paper. 
8.2.5.1 Journal paper 
[107] I. Goicoechea-Telleria, K. Kiyokawa, J. L. Jimenez, and R. Sanchez-Reillo, 
“Low-cost and efficient hardware solution for presentation attack detection in 
fingerprint biometrics using special lighting microscopes,” IEEE Access, vol. 7, pp. 1–
1, 2019. 
• PAD evaluation with special lighting microscopes. 
8.2.5.2 Standardization 
No contribution could be done to the standards dealing with presentation attack 
detection, as it is already finished, and no further comments can be made. 
Nevertheless, contributions will be made when the revision is due. 
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Chapter 9. Conclusions and future 
work 
______________________ 
 
THIS CHAPTER DESCRIBES the general lessons that were learnt during the process of 
this work and gives suggestions for future work, as specific conclusions were previously 
detailed for each experiment and chapter. 
9.1 Conclusions 
Security evaluations are necessary to assess a device’s ability to reject access to non-
authorized users. To be able to make such evaluations, it is necessary to have a common 
ground so that they can be compared among researchers and certification bodies. 
Studies are only comparable if the same metrics and procedures are used. For this 
Thesis, a methodology was developed by joining the standards ISO/IEC 30107 [2], [92] 
and ISO/IEC 19989 [108], Common Criteria [18], a methodology for the evaluation of 
mobile devices [21] and a methodology for security evaluations [19], and it was applied 
to several PAD evaluations on different mobile devices with embedded fingerprint 
sensors and off-the-shelf desktop fingerprint readers [22], [23], [95], [97]–[99].  
Along all studies, it was repeatedly proven that people with no expertise in attacking 
fingerprint devices could successfully attack them within a week or less, just by 
watching a video of a researcher doing it. Very similar videos are available on well-
known online platforms for everyone to see. Moreover, the materials used were readily 
available in supermarkets on online marketplaces.  
Evaluation of Presentation Attack Detection under the Context of Common Criteria 
______________________ 
114 
 
Another notable outcome is that the real difficulty of making fingerprints out of a 
latent print was put to the test, by finding an easier process to steal them and 
performing a PAD evaluation [97]. For that, a cell phone camera with the flash 
activated was used then processed automatically with a smartphone document scanner 
app. It was possible to reproduce fingerprints left behind on the screen by the genuine 
user and use them on the scanners of 5 smartphones. All smartphones were, again, 
successfully attacked. 
Attack potential is an adequate tool to measure the effort needed to attack a system. 
Nevertheless, in the case of Biometrics it is difficult to calculate. Even within the same 
evaluation, the evaluator gets better at attacking the system in each attempt. Also, at 
any point of the process, anyone can get the trick to hacking a specific sensor (out of 
expertise and, mostly, out of luck) and the evaluation results can vary highly from that 
point on. To soften this variability, one solution is reporting examples of the molds, 
artefacts and captured images of the evaluation. 
Once commercial desktop and mobile device readers were evaluated following 
ISO/IEC 30107, it was clearly seen that PAD mechanisms are urgently needed in the 
implementation of biometric systems. Thus, it was decided to develop a new technique 
for detecting presentation attacks. This part of the work gathers a thorough evaluation 
on a presentation attack detection technique and proposes a novel method to acquire 
fingerprints, having carried out the capture (including selection of hardware and the 
design of capture tools) and processing, classification and results analysis. As an 
outcome, a low-cost and good performing PAD subsystem was obtained [107]. This is 
meaningful because hardware solutions have barely been researched and there are 
scarce reports, and usually these methods yield a high cost. 
It was seen that it is possible to achieve a low APCER and BPCER values using only 
one wavelength (575nm) with a filter (610nm) and taking only the red channel, which 
makes it inexpensive and accurate (APCER of 1.78% and BPCER of 1.33% at 70% 
training). Moreover, although it must be more thoroughly tested and with a bigger 
database, all iterations of classifying the 480/510nm wavelength of the blue channel 
have shown a BPCER of 0,00%. Furthermore, it was discovered that Play-Doh artefacts 
are very easy to detect with this approach, which is a very commonly used material. 
In addition, the database included one subject whose fingerprints did not have any 
noticeable ridges and valleys due to a skin disease, and it was seen that the attack 
detection error only improved very slightly when removing these samples. That means 
that this approach is also appropriate for these cases. 
Moreover, the security analysis of biometric mechanisms should include a risk 
analysis that meets the needs of the users and the final application. For instance, levels 
of comfort and security are different for a normal mobile phone usage and for a high 
security device. That is, even though currently biometric technologies are vulnerable, 
they do increase the level of security, needing more effort from the attacker to gain 
restricted information. With the inclusion of better presentation attack detection 
mechanisms, vulnerabilities could be highly reduced maintaining a good level of 
comfort. Therefore, Biometrics is a viable and powerful tool for identification systems. 
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In summary, the milestones achieved by this Thesis include: 
• Improvements on the presentation attack detection evaluation 
methodology. 
• Contributions to ISO/IEC 30107 - Biometric presentation attack detection - 
Part 3:  Testing and reporting and Part 4: Profile for evaluation of mobile 
devices. 
• Presentation attack detection evaluations on commercial desktop and 
smartphone fingerprint sensors following ISO/IEC 30107-3 and 4, 
considering different variables to study: cooperative vs. non-cooperative, 
time limitations, expertise. 
• A new low-cost and efficient optical presentation attack detection system 
and an evaluation on the said system. 
9.2 Future work 
There are numerous lines of work than can stem from this Thesis, both on the PAD 
evaluation and PAD mechanism developing sides: 
• PAD evaluation: in the future and in general, PAD evaluations should be 
performed with more than one attacker, as it was proven in this work that 
the IAPMR depends on the person performing the attacks. Also, more types 
of materials can be used for testing PAD mechanisms of both smartphone 
and desktop readers. Moreover, it would be interesting to study the artefact 
creation under different environmental conditions, as results may vary, as 
seen on this work. Furthermore, the difference in IAPMR between fingers 
could be studied, as different fingers yield different results. Lastly, a quality 
assessment could be performed along with the PAD attempts to check if 
there is any relationship between quality and attack performance.  
• PAD mechanisms: the most important future work would be to gather a 
bigger user database. Along those lines, more attackers should perform the 
same types of attacks on the system, because as it was seen during this work, 
different evaluators obtain different results when attacking systems. 
Moreover, on the classification side, a plethora of more approaches can be 
explored for image pre-processing, as the classification algorithm was fed 
raw images. Furthermore, fusion methods could be examined by combining 
several wavelengths. 
As current ongoing work, all the considerations explained in this Thesis are being 
discussed and contributed in ISO/IEC 30107 Parts 3 and 4, as a follow up of the 
contributions made by the author in previous phases of the standard. 
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